This version of the paper does not contain the graphs No. 3 to 82 because they require much storage space. They may be ordered from Christian Seidl, cseidl@gmx.net. These graphs just illustrate the text. Part of them just presents the content of the tables in a graphical way.
TAX PROGRESSION: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERTEMPORAL COMPARISONS USING LIS DATA

by Kirill Pogorelskiy*, Christian Seidl‡, and Stefan Traub†

Abstract

The conventional approach to comparing tax progression (using local measures, global measures or dominance relations for first moment distribution functions) often lacks applicability to the real world: local measures of tax progression have the disadvantage of ignoring the income distribution entirely. Global measures are affected by the drawback of all aggregation, viz. ignoring structural differences between the objects to be compared. Dominance relations of comparing tax progression depend heavily on the assumption that the same income distribution holds for both situations to be compared, which renders this approach impossible for international and intertemporal comparisons.

Based on the earlier work of one of the authors, this paper develops a unified methodology to compare tax progression for dominance relations under different income distributions. We address it as uniform tax progression for different income distributions and present the respective approach for both continuous and discrete cases, the latter also being employed for empirical investigations.

Using dominance relations, we define tax progression under different income distributions as a class of natural extensions of uniform tax progression in terms of taxes, net incomes, and differences of first moment distribution functions. To cope with different monetary units and different supports of the income distributions involved, we utilized their transformations to population and income quantiles. Altogether, we applied six methods of comparing tax progression, three in terms of taxes and three in terms of net incomes, which we utilized for empirical analyses of comparisons of tax progression using data from the Luxembourg Income Study. This is the first paper that performs international and intertemporal comparisons of uniform tax progression with actual data.

For our analysis we chose those countries for which LIS disposes of data on gross incomes, taxes, payroll taxes and net incomes. This pertains to 15 countries, out of which we selected 13. This gave rise to 78 international comparisons, which we investigated 312 international comparisons for each of the six methods of comparing tax progression.

In two thirds of all cases we observed uniformly greater tax progression for international comparisons. In a bit more than one fifth of all cases we observed bifurcate tax progression, that is, progression is higher for one country up to some population or income quantile threshold, beyond which the situation is the opposite, i.e., progression is higher for the second country. No clear-cut findings can be reported for just one tenth of all cases. Even in these cases deviations are sometimes so small that they can be ignored.

We also test consistency of our results with regard to the six methods of comparing tax progression and present here twelve (Germany, the UK and the US) plus four comparing Germany and Sweden out of the total of 312 graphs, each containing six differences of first moment distribution functions. These differences can be interpreted as intensity of greater tax progression. We demonstrate the overall picture of uniform tax progression for international comparisons using Hasse diagrams.

Concerning intertemporal comparisons of tax progression, we present the results for the US, the UK, and Germany for several time periods. We align our findings with respect to major political eras in these countries, e.g., G. Bush Sr., W. Clinton, and G. Bush Jr. for the United States; M. Thatcher, J. Major, and A. Blair for the United Kingdom, and for Germany, the last year before German re-unification (1989), the beginning of H. Kohl’s last term as chancellor (1994), and G. Schröder (2000). In addition, we study sensitivity of our results to the equivalence scale parameter.

JEL Classification: H23.

Keywords: income tax progression, measurement of uniform tax progression, international comparisons of tax progression, intertemporal comparisons of tax progression, tax progression with different income distributions.

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1 Introduction

Tax progression has ever been of concern, not only to the profession, but also to politicians, let alone to the man on the street. Hence, measurement of tax progression and international as well as intertemporal comparisons of tax progression are of utmost importance. Alas, the existing methodology of measuring and comparing tax progression allows only answers to problems which are outside of central interest. There are three main routes of research, viz. local, global, and uniform measures of tax progression. Local measures of tax progression, in particular its main representatives, tax revenue elasticity and residual income elasticity, concentrate on the tax schedule only and neglect the important role of the income distribution for tax progression. If a certain tax schedule happens to be rather progressive but hits very few people only, then the respective tax system should not be viewed as highly progressive. Global measures of tax progression weigh taxation or the net incomes by the income distribution in addition to some other weights, but this very aggregation procedure is its main drawback. A tax schedule which is regressive over some income intervals may be categorized to be more progressive than another tax schedule which is progressive throughout just because of compensation due to the aggregation procedure. Uniform measures of tax progression which work by way of single-crossing conditions or by relative concentration curves require the same income distributions for all cases to be compared. This means that questions such as “Is the tax schedule of the U.S.A. associated with the American income distribution more or less progressive than the German tax schedule associated with the German income distribution?” cannot be answered by using this approach.

To handle these realistic problems, Seidl (1994) developed an approach in which comparisons are based on population quantiles or income quantiles with respect to taxes or net incomes rather than on tax schedules directly in terms of income. This method allows to substitute the income distributions with different supports by quantiles with the unit interval as the common support of different distributions. The idea of this approach is the following: if a tax schedule for one country collects relatively less tax revenue from the lower income strata than does a tax revenue of another country, then the first one is considered as more progressive. Alternatively, if the first tax schedule leaves the lower income strata relatively more net income than does the tax schedule of another country, then the first tax schedule is considered as more progressive. The comparison of these relative positions is carried out in terms of the
tax quantiles for the population quantiles or for the income quantiles.\textsuperscript{1} In his theoretical work, Seidl (1994) made use of concavity or convexity conditions of relative concentration curves, which, however, yielded only sufficient conditions in terms of elasticities, but not necessary conditions of uniformly more or less tax progression. It seems that no general analytic solution to this problem exists.\textsuperscript{2}

The main purpose of this paper is an empirical investigation of international and intertemporal comparisons of tax progression utilizing this approach. We used data from the Luxembourg Income Study, LIS (2010), for 13 out of 15 countries for which data for gross incomes, direct taxes, payroll taxes and net incomes are available (see Table 1 in Section 4.1). We made separate comparisons for household incomes and for equivalized incomes (using the Luxembourg equivalence scale) and for progression of direct taxes and direct taxes plus payroll taxes (mainly comprising the employees’ share of social security contributions). This gave us four times 78 international comparisons. Moreover, we applied six measurement devices for comparisons of tax progression, four in terms of population quantiles and two in terms of income quantiles. In addition to that, we also investigated intertemporal comparisons of tax progression for some selected countries and studied the influence of the scale parameter of the Luxembourg equivalence scales for comparisons of tax progression.

Section 2 reviews local and global measures of tax progression, Section 3 deals with uniform tax progression, first for identical income distributions, which represents the consuetudinary theory, second for different income distributions in the continuous version, and third for different income distributions in the discrete version in preparation for empirical investigations. Section 4 displays the results of our research. This section starts reviewing the properties and the handling of LIS data, continues with an intuition about working with grouped data, and proceeds then with an elaborate discussion of the results

\textsuperscript{1}Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) took a different route: rather than replacing incomes by quantiles, they transplanted the income distributions by deformation functions (p. 102), thereby remaining in the domain of incomes. For instance, when comparing the United States with Germany, they propose deforming the German income distribution to the American income distribution and look whether the American tax system, when applied to the deformed compound distribution, is more or less progressive than the American tax system as applied to the American income distribution. Alternatively, the American income distribution can be deformed to Germany, or both distributions can be deformed to a fictive third income distribution.

\textsuperscript{2}Note that by a “general analytic solution” we mean the one that yields non-trivial necessary and sufficient conditions. For instance, it is immediate that there is uniformly greater progression if and only if the curve obtained by taking the differences of the transformed first moment curves of taxes or net incomes does not change its sign within the unit interval. This condition, however, is a mere reformulation of the definition of uniform tax progression (see Section 3.3).
of our research. The tables and graphs are placed at the end of the paper.

2 Local and Global Measures of Tax Progression

This paper employs the following notation: $Y$ denotes income, $[Y^*, Y^*]$ denotes the support of the income distribution, $f(Y) \geq 0$ denotes the density function and $F(Y)$ the distribution function of the income distribution, $q$ denotes the population quantiles and $p$ the income quantiles of gross incomes, $\mu := \int_{Y^*}^{Y^*} Y f(Y) dY$ denotes mean gross income, $T(Y)$ denotes the income tax schedule, $\frac{T(Y)}{Y}$ denotes the average income tax schedule, $\frac{dT(Y)}{dY}$ denotes the marginal income tax schedule, and $\tau := \int_{Y^*}^{Y^*} T(Y) f(Y) dY$ denotes mean tax.

Local measures of income tax progression just focus on the tax schedule. The more primitive ones are the first derivative of the average tax schedule and the difference of the marginal and the average tax schedules. They are positive for progressive and negative for regressive tax schedules. More refined measures are the tax elasticity $\varepsilon(Y) := \frac{dT(Y)/dY}{T(Y)/Y}$ and the residual income elasticity $\eta(Y) := \frac{d[Y - T(Y)]/dY}{[Y - T(Y)]/Y}$. As a mnemonic device note that the tax elasticity is the ratio of marginal and average tax rates, and the residual income elasticity is the ratio of the marginal and the average retention rates. $\varepsilon(y)$ measures liability progression, $\eta(y)$ residual income progression. According to liability progression, a tax schedule is progressive at $\tilde{Y}$ if $\varepsilon(\tilde{Y}) > 1$; according to residual income progression a tax schedule is progressive at $\tilde{Y}$ if $0 < \eta(\tilde{Y}) < 1$. The meaning of these two local measures of tax progression is simple: $\varepsilon(\tilde{Y}) > 1$ means that the tax on an extra monetary unit for a taxpayer with income $\tilde{Y}$ exceeds his or her average tax burden; $0 < \eta(\tilde{Y}) < 1$ means that an extra monetary unit leaves a taxpayer less net income than under his or her average retention rate. Note that both measures are equivalent for the general diagnosis of tax progression, that is, we have $\varepsilon(\tilde{Y}) > 1 \iff 0 < \eta(\tilde{Y}) < 1$, but this equivalence does not apply to comparisons of tax progression. This means that for two tax schedules $T^1(Y)$ and $T^2(Y)$ it does not follow that $\varepsilon^1(\tilde{Y}) > \varepsilon^2(\tilde{Y})$ holds if and only if $\eta^1(\tilde{Y}) < \eta^2(\tilde{Y})$ holds. For a numerical illustration on a former German income tax reform see Seidl and Kaletha (1987).

Local measures of tax progression have a crucial drawback: they are completely separated from income
distributions. Hence, the fractions of people affected by the various parts of a tax schedule are neglected by local measures of tax progression. Yet for comparisons of tax progression, the fractions of the population affected by the various parts of a tax schedule are important. Suppose that a tax schedule is very progressive, yet nobody in a society is affected by the very high rates of this tax schedule. Then this tax schedule will be perceived as less progressive than a tax schedule with more moderate rates which, however, cut in broad strata of taxpayers.

For an effective income distribution we can employ local measures of tax progression for purposes of progression comparison if we have dominance relationships throughout, e.g., $\varepsilon_1(Y) > \varepsilon_2(Y)$ or $\eta_1(Y) < \eta_2(Y)$ for all $Y$. If these relationships apply, then greater tax progression of tax schedules holds trivially for all income distributions. We will see below that similar relations represent sufficient conditions for greater tax progression for uniform tax progression. Note that they may, although more complicated, also be expressed in terms of $q$ and $p$; we will come to these expressions below.

The introduction of income distributions into comparisons of tax progression can be done in two ways: the first one takes the route of aggregate measures which map taxes and incomes into the real numbers—these are *global measures of tax progression*; the second one uses dominance relations—these are *measures of uniform tax progression*.

Global measures of tax progression are based on income distribution measures of gross incomes, net incomes, and taxes. In the simplest cases the Gini coefficient is used. Examples include, inter alia, the measure proposed by Dalton (1922/1954, pp. 107-8) as the mean deviation of average tax rates (which is just the Gini coefficient of the average tax rates), or the measure proposed by Reynolds and Smolensky (1977), which is simply the difference of the Gini coefficients of net and gross incomes. Pechman and Okner (1974) and Okner (1975) proposed to normalize the Reynolds-Smolensky measure by the Gini coefficient of gross incomes. The Musgrave and Thin (1948) measure of effective progression is the ratio of the areas under the Lorenz curves for gross and net incomes. Many more global measures of tax progression were

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3For short surveys see Kiefer (1984, pp. 498-9), Seidl (1994, pp. 343-6), and Peichl and Schäfer (2008, pp. 3-5). Kiefer (1984, p. 497) distinguished two groups of global measures of tax progression, viz. *structural indices*, which are functions of incomes and their respective taxes, and *distributional indices*, which are functions of the tax structure and the distribution of post-tax incomes. If this classification is extended to measures of uniform tax progression, then our Definitions 1, 2, and 5 in Section 3.3 are structural measures of tax progression, and Definitions 3, 4, and 6 are distributional measures of tax progression.

4The area under the Lorenz curve is one minus the Gini coefficient divided by two.

Pfähler (1987, p. 7), suggested a general framework for global measures of tax progression. He showed that most of the measures based on distributional measures can be expressed as the weighted sum of local relative deviations \[ T(Y) - \frac{\overline{Y}}{\mu} Y \] of the actual tax schedule from a revenue-neutral proportional tax schedule. For the expression of the global progression measures in terms of differences between the distributions of net incomes and gross incomes, Pfähler (1987, p. 12) showed that they can be defined using the very same weights for the weighted sum of local relative deviations \[ Y - T(Y) - (1 - \frac{\overline{Y}}{\mu}) Y \] of actual net incomes from revenue-neutral net incomes under a proportional tax.5

Global measures of tax progression not only serve to categorize tax schedules into progressive, proportional and regressive, but also to derive an ordering of tax progression. If progression is measured in terms of positive (negative) values, then tax schedule \( T^1(\cdot) \) is more progressive than \( T^2(\cdot) \) if the global measure applied shows a higher (lower) value for \( T^1(\cdot) \) than for \( T^2(\cdot) \).

Global measures of tax progression have several advantages. First, they work for different tax schedules and different income distributions. This means that international and intertemporal comparisons of tax progression can be effectuated. Second, they feature a double weighting, both by some weights particular to the specific global measure, and by the income distribution. That is, particular characteristics of a tax schedule gain more (less) weight if more (less) taxpayers are affected. Third, global measures of tax progression are able to compensate income subintervals with opposite properties of tax schedules by appropriate weighting and subsequent aggregation.

However, at the same time this last advantage turns out as a major handicap of global measures of tax progression. Aggregating the effects of tax schedules over the whole support of the income distribution may lead to the result that \( T^1(\cdot) \) is categorized as being more progressive than \( T^2(\cdot) \), although \( T^1(\cdot) \) has a decreasing average tax rate throughout some subinterval of the income support, while \( T^2(\cdot) \)'s average tax schedule is increasing throughout the whole income support. Alternatively, suppose that a tax schedule

\[ \text{Using appropriate weighting functions, this approach encompasses many global measures of tax progression, e.g., as proposed by Musgrave and Thin (1948), Hainsworth (1984), Khetan and Poddar (1976), Suits (1977), Kakwani (1977b, 1984, 1987), Pfähler (1987), and Lambert (1988).} \]
is progressive for the lower incomes and regressive for the upper incomes. This may lead to a Lorenz
curve of gross incomes which intersects the Lorenz curve of net incomes. In this case we cannot exclude
that the two Gini coefficients have the same value (or that their difference is very small), which would
indicate a proportional (or close to proportional) tax schedule under some measures of tax progression,
although this tax schedule is far from being proportional (see also Suits (1977, p. 752) for a critique of
global measures of tax progression). The second handicap of global measures of tax progression is rooted in
their aggregation procedure, which presupposes comparability of the tax burden across all income strata.
This is much related to the assumption of interpersonal comparability of utility. These handicaps led to
the development of uniform measures of tax progression which we consider in the next section.

3 Uniform Tax Progression

Uniform tax progression adopts yet another concept of progression comparisons. Again, it can be formul-
ated in terms of taxes or in terms of net incomes. For the presentation in this paper we shall stick to
their original formulations.

3.1 Uniform Tax Progression for Identical Income Distributions

The main work on uniform tax progression was done under the assumption of identical income distributions
for the two tax schedules to be compared.

Jakobsson (1976, p. 165) used elasticity properties of tax schedules to characterize more progressive
tax schedules. His theorem purports that if \( T^1(\cdot) \) is more progressive than \( T^2(\cdot) \) for all possible income
distributions with the same support \([Y_*, Y^*]\), then \( \eta^1(Y) \leq \eta^2(Y) \) for all \( Y \in [Y_*, Y^*] \) and \( \eta^1(Y) < \eta^2(Y) \) for
a nonempty subinterval of \([Y_*, Y^*]\) (the necessary condition). On the other hand, if for a particular pair of
income distributions with the same support \([Y_*, Y^*]\), \( \eta^1(Y) \leq \eta^2(Y) \) for all \( Y \in [Y_*, Y^*] \) and \( \eta^1(Y) < \eta^2(Y) \)
for a nonempty subinterval of \([Y_*, Y^*]\), then \( T^1(\cdot) \) is more progressive than \( T^2(\cdot) \) (the sufficient condition).
The key difference between the necessary and the sufficient conditions of greater tax progression lies in
the fact that the latter can be applied to some given pair of income distributions, while the former is
applicable only if all possible income distributions are considered.

As concerns the proof, the sufficiency part of this theorem is obvious; it follows immediately from the
properties of residual income progression (see its definition in Section 2). For the necessity part of this theorem, Jakobsson (1976, p. 165) considered the case that \( n_1(Y) \leq n_2(Y) \) holds generally, except for an income subinterval for which \( n_1(Y) > n_2(Y) \) holds. Then \( T_1(\cdot) \) cannot be more progressive than \( T_2(\cdot) \) because “we could always choose an income distribution before tax that lies completely within the latter interval.” For this latter interval, the tax schedule \( T_2(\cdot) \) is more progressive than \( T_1(\cdot) \).

Notice that if \( n_1(Y) < n_2(Y) \) holds for all \( Y \in [Y_*, Y^*] \), then \( T_1(\cdot) \) generates systematically lower net incomes than \( T_2(\cdot) \) if the same income distribution holds for both tax schedules. This means that \( T_1(\cdot) \) raises more revenue than \( T_2(\cdot) \). In other words, Jakobsson’s theorem is inconsistent with the assumption that \( T_1(\cdot) \) and \( T_2(\cdot) \) can raise the same revenue. \( T_1(\cdot) \), it is true, causes a more equal distribution of net incomes than \( T_2(\cdot) \), however bought at the price of a higher tax burden for all. The lower income strata are only left with the satisfaction that the upper income strata are pinched relatively more under the tax schedule \( T_1(\cdot) \).

Kakwani (1977a), too, relied on elasticities for progression comparisons, but took another route. His point of departure are the first-moment distribution functions of taxes and net incomes:

\[
F_T(Y) := \frac{1}{T} \int_{Y_*}^{Y} T(y) f(y) dy;
\]

\[
F_{Y-T}(Y) := \frac{1}{\mu - T} \int_{Y_*}^{Y} [y - T(y)] f(y) dy.
\]

These functions indicate the share of total tax revenue (total net income) paid (received) by the income recipients with gross incomes less or equal to \( Y \).

For two tax schedules Kakwani (1977a) employed the concentration curve of \( F_{T_1}(Y) \) relative to \( F_{T_2}(Y) \), and analogously for the net incomes. This relative concentration curve is defined on the unit square [note that the range of both \( F_T(Y) \) and \( F_{Y-T}(Y) \) is the unit interval], where \( F_{T_1}(Y) \) is depicted on the ordinate and \( F_{T_2}(Y) \) on the abscissa. If this relative concentration curve lies below the diagonal, then, except at the endpoints \( Y_* \) and \( Y^* \), \( F_{T_1}(Y) \) collects for all income levels \( Y \) a lower share of tax revenue than does \( F_{T_2}(Y) \). Hence, \( F_{T_1}(\cdot) \) is more progressive than \( F_{T_2}(\cdot) \).

The second derivative of a strictly convex (concave) function is positive (negative). For a positive second derivative of the relative concentration curve of taxes \( \varepsilon^1(Y) \geq \varepsilon^2(Y) \) holds, for a negative second derivative of the relative concentration curve of net incomes \( \eta^1(Y) \leq \eta^2(Y) \) holds. Alas, these conditions are sufficient conditions for greater tax progression, but not necessary conditions. This results from
Kakwani’s confinement to a particular income distribution rather than to the universe of all income distributions. A particular income distribution and two tax schedules may yield a relative concentration curve lying wholly below the diagonal, although $\varepsilon^1(Y) < \varepsilon^2(Y)$ holds for some subinterval of the support of the income distribution. This applies mutatis mutandis also to net incomes. After all, this case seems to us the more realistic one because one wants to compare tax schedules not with respect to the universe of income distributions, but for an empirically given pair of income distributions.

A third approach developed by Hemming and Keen (1983) relies on single crossing conditions. According to their findings, $T^1(\cdot)$ is more progressive than $T^2(\cdot)$ if the net income function $Y - T^1(Y)$ crosses the net income function resulting from $T^2(\cdot)$, viz. $Y - T^2(Y)$, once from below, say, at $\tilde{Y}$. In their proof, they start demonstrating that this holds for tax schedules raising the same revenue. The intuition behind this proposition is clear: tax progression means that the lower income strata pay relatively less than the upper income strata under $T^1(\cdot)$ than under $T^2(\cdot)$. In other words, the lower income strata have relatively more net income than the upper income strata under $T^1(\cdot)$ than under $T^2(\cdot)$. By the assumption of revenue-neutral tax schedules, this translates into absolute figures. Due to revenue neutrality, the upper income strata have to pay exactly the same amount of tax more under $T^1(\cdot)$ than under $T^2(\cdot)$, as the lower income strata pay more under $T^2(\cdot)$ than under $T^1(\cdot)$. If $T^1(\cdot)$ and $T^2(\cdot)$ are not revenue neutral, then the two cases have to be normalized and the argument translates into relative figures. This is Hemming and Keen’s (1983) second proposition.

Obviously, this constitutes a sufficient condition of greater tax progression. The necessary part of the proof comes from Hemming and Keen’s (1983) requirement that it should hold for all income distributions. Suppose, for instance, that there are two crossings: let $Y - T^1(Y)$ cross $Y - T^2(Y)$ at $\tilde{Y} > Y_*$ from below and at $\tilde{Y}$, $Y^* > \tilde{Y} > Y_*$, from above. Consider now $\hat{Y}$, $\tilde{Y} > \hat{Y} > \tilde{Y}$. Then there exist income distributions such that $T^1(\cdot)$ and $T^2(\cdot)$ raise the same revenue for $Y \in [Y_*,\hat{Y})$ and raise the same revenue (possibly different from the first interval) for $Y \in [\tilde{Y},Y^*)$. Then $T^1(\cdot)$ is more progressive than $T^2(\cdot)$ on the income interval $[Y_*,\hat{Y})$ and less progressive on $[\tilde{Y},Y^*)$. Hence, the necessary part of the proof requires that the single-crossing condition should hold for the universe of income distributions.

The relationship between Kakwani’s (1977a) elasticity condition and Hemming and Keen’s (1983) single-crossing condition is the following: obviously

$$\ln \frac{Y - T^1(Y)}{Y - T^2(Y)} = \ln[Y - T^1(Y)] - \ln[Y - T^2(Y)].$$

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Differentiating this with respect to \( Y \), multiplying the right-hand side by \( \frac{Y}{Y} \), re-arranging and using the definition for \( \eta(Y) \) yields
\[
\frac{d}{dY} \{ \ln[Y - T^1(Y)] - \ln[Y - T^2(Y)] \} = \frac{\eta^1(Y) - \eta^2(Y)}{Y}.
\]
Applying an exponential transformation on Equation (3) and substituting the integral of Equation (4) yields
\[
\frac{Y - T^1(Y)}{Y - T^2(Y)} = e^{\int_{\tilde{Y}}^{Y} \frac{\eta^1(y) - \eta^2(y)}{y} dy}
\]
for \( \tilde{Y} \leq Y \leq Y^* \), where \( \tilde{Y} \) denotes the income at which the net income curves cross.

When \( \eta^1(Y) \leq \eta^2(Y) \) for all \( Y > \tilde{Y} \) and the inequality sign is strict for some nonempty interval of \( (\tilde{Y}, Y^*) \), then \( [Y - T^1(Y)] < [Y - T^2(Y)] \) for all \( y \in (\tilde{Y}, Y^*) \). In other words, the single-crossing condition holds. Hence, the condition \( \eta^1(Y) \leq \eta^2(Y) \) for all \( Y \in [Y^*, Y^*] \) is sufficient for the single-crossing condition to hold. Conversely, when the single-crossing condition holds, this does not imply that \( \eta^1(Y) \leq \eta^2(Y) \) for all \( Y \in [Y^*, Y^*] \). \( \eta^1(Y) > \eta^2(Y) \) may well hold for a subinterval of \( [Y^*, \tilde{Y}] \), or for a subinterval of \( (\tilde{Y}, Y^*) \), while leaving the integral term in equation (5) negative.

Uniform measures of tax progression for identical income distributions have several drawbacks. First, by definition, they are only applicable for comparing tax schedules in situations with the same income distributions. Hence, they cannot be used for international or intertemporal comparisons of tax progression which are typically associated with different income distributions. These measures can only be used for assessing progression effects of different tax schedules to be considered for the same income distribution, e.g., for assessing the effects of tax reform proposals. Second, uniform measures of tax progression establish just sufficient conditions of greater tax progression if considered not for all possible income distributions, but for particular ones.\(^6\) It is, in particular, the first drawback which suggests an extension to comparisons of progression for tax schedules associated with different income distributions.

\(^6\)On the other hand, Kakwani’s (1977a) sufficiency conditions extend to necessary conditions if they should apply to the universe of income distributions.
3.2 Uniform Tax Progression for Different Income Distributions: Continuous Version

The analysis of comparisons of uniform tax progression with different income distributions can be performed in terms of relative concentration curves of first moment distribution functions or in terms of first- or second-order differences of first moment distribution functions. Note, at the outset, that first moment distribution function of the shape (1) or (2) are inappropriate for comparisons of tax progression of different tax schedules associated with different income distributions. The reason is that this analysis holds only if both income distributions have equal support, which is extremely unlikely. For two functions of type (1) unequal support means that

$$1 = F_{T_1}(\tilde{Y}) > F_{T_2}(\tilde{Y})$$

where \(\tilde{Y}\) is equal to the maximum income \(Y_1^*\) for the first income distribution, but smaller than the maximum income \(Y_2^*\) for the second income distribution. This means that a relative concentration curve starts at the point \((0,0)\), but does not reach the point \((1,1)\). Thus, it is a degenerate relative concentration curve which cannot be used for comparisons of tax progression.

Instead, we have to apply transformations from the income distributions on \([Y_1^*, Y_1^*]\) and \([Y_2^*, Y_2^*]\), respectively, onto the unit interval. Several methods are available. Two of them stand out, viz. the expression in terms of population quantiles \(q = F(Y)\), and in terms of income quantiles \(p = F_Y(Y) = \frac{1}{\mu} \int_{Y_1}^{Y} yf(y)dy\). \(q\) indicates the fraction of the persons in the lower income strata with maximum income \(Y\); \(p\) indicates the fraction of the aggregate income of the lower income strata with maximum income \(Y\).\(^7\) Obviously \(F(Y) > F_Y(Y)\) because every person with income less or equal to \(Y\) is counted by \(F(Y)\) with the same population weight, whereas \(F_Y(Y)\) counts the smallest incomes up to \(Y\) and expresses their aggregate as a fraction of total income, because smaller incomes contribute less weight. Conversely, \(F^{-1}(q) < F_Y^{-1}(p)\) for \(q = p\) because the \((q \times 100)\) percent lowest income earners have a lower maximum income than the maximum income of the \((q \times 100) = (p \times 100)\) percent of aggregate income.

A simple transformation of variables \(Y = F^{-1}(q)\) for the first moment distribution function of incomes, \(F_Y(Y) = \frac{1}{\mu} \int_{Y_1}^{Y} yf(y)dy\), and for the first moment distributions functions (1) and (2) gives us

\[
F_Y(q) = \frac{1}{\mu} \int_{0}^{q} F^{-1}(\tilde{q})d\tilde{q};
\]

\(^7\)Note the this approach has also the advantage that the effects of inflation for intertemporal comparisons of tax progression are normalized by population or income shares. At the same time, different currencies are also calibrated and unified by this approach, which renders international comparisons of tax progression viable.
\( F_T(q) = \frac{1}{\tau} \int_0^q T[F^{-1}(\tilde{q})]d\tilde{q}; \)  

\( F_{Y-T}(q) = \frac{1}{\mu - \tau} \int_0^q \{F^{-1}(\tilde{q}) - T[F^{-1}(\tilde{q})]\}d\tilde{q}. \)

A transformation of variables \( Y = F_Y^{-1}(p) \) for (1) and (2) gives us

\( F_Y^T(p) = \frac{\mu}{\mu - \tau} \int_0^p \frac{T[F_Y^{-1}(\tilde{p})]}{F_Y^{-1}(\tilde{p})}d\tilde{p}, \)

\( F_{Y-T}^Y(p) = \frac{\mu}{\mu - \tau} \int_0^p \frac{\{F_Y^{-1}(\tilde{p}) - T[F_Y^{-1}(\tilde{p})]\}}{F_Y^{-1}(\tilde{p})}d\tilde{p}, \)

where the expression under the integral in equation (9) is the average tax schedule, and in equation (10) it is the average retention rate.

Note that \( F_Y(q) \) is the Lorenz curve of the gross income, \( F_T(q) \) is the Lorenz curve of the tax distribution, and \( F_{Y-T}(q) \) is the Lorenz curve of the net income distribution.\(^9\) \( F_Y^T(p) \) denotes the fraction of total tax revenue paid by all taxpayers whose aggregate gross income amounts to the fraction \( p \) of total gross income. \( F_{Y-T}^Y(p) \) denotes the fraction of aggregate net income of all taxpayers whose aggregate gross income amounts to the fraction \( p \) of total gross income. Notice the difference between \( F_T(q) \) and \( F_Y^T(p) \): \( F_T(q) \) denotes the share of total tax revenue paid by the fraction \( q \) of the poorest taxpayers, whereas \( F_Y^T(p) \) denotes the share of total tax revenue paid by the poorest taxpayers whose compound gross income is a fraction \( p \) of total gross income. This means that we have \( F_T(q) < F_Y^T(p) \) for any given unequal income distribution and for any strictly increasing average tax schedule \( T(Y)/Y \), if \( 1 > q = p > 0 \), because the fraction \( q \) of the poorest taxpayers holds only a fraction of total gross income, \( F_Y(q) \), which is smaller than \( F_Y^T(p) = p \) for \( q = p \).

Next, we define uniformly greater progression of tax schedules associated with their respective income distributions. This can be done in at least two ways. Firstly, a tax schedule \( T_1 \) can be defined to be uniformly more progressive than \( T_2 \) whenever the concentration curve of \( F_{T_1} \) relative to \( F_{T_2} \) does not cross

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\(^8\)Equations (9) and (14) (the latter for the discrete case) are the so-called Suits (1977) curves. Suits used the tax curve to construct a global measure of tax progression similarly to the Gini coefficient for measuring income inequality. Note that \( F_Y^T(p) \) is just the diagonal through the unit square. Therefore, this formulation is omitted.

\(^9\)This means that we assume away re-ranking in our theoretical analysis. We will come back to this point in the next section.
the diagonal of the unit square except at the endpoints (0,0) and (1,1). To illustrate, we focus on the case of entering $F_{T_1}$ on the ordinate and $F_{T_2}$ on the abscissa, and on the half-space of the unit square below the diagonal. Other arrangements are immediate. This means that for the same fractions $q$ or $p$ as applied to the two income distributions,\(^{10}\) $T^1$ collects a smaller fraction of aggregate taxes from smaller incomes than does $T^2$. A sufficient condition for the concentration curve of $F_{T_1}$ relative to $F_{T_2}$ to lie wholly below the diagonal of the unit square is that it is strictly convex.\(^{11}\) Figure 1 illustrates this case in terms of $q$.

Alas, the convexity (or concavity) condition is not a necessary condition for greater tax progression. When comparing two situations, then there may well occur cases such that convexity or concavity of the relative concentration curve is violated without its crossing the diagonal within the unit square. Figure 2 illustrates.

\(^{10}\)It can also be performed in terms of $Y$ but this would require that both income distributions involved have equal support; see Seidl (1994, pp. 347-9).

\(^{11}\)Equivalently, one can require that the slope of a relative concentration curve be less than one below a unique value of its argument and greater than one thereafter. Whereas this is equivalent to strict convexity for the case of relative concentration curves, strict convexity produces the more intuitive and precise formulations of the sufficient conditions.
Figure 2: \((Y_1, T_1)\) more progressive than \((Y_2, T_2)\) with nonconvex relative concentration curve

Alternatively, we may define a tax schedule \(T^1\) to be uniformly more progressive than \(T^2\) whenever the concentration curve of \(F_{Y_1-T^1}\) (ordinate) relative to \(F_{Y_2-T^2}\) (abscissa) lies wholly above the diagonal of the unit square except at the endpoints of the support of the income distribution. This means that \(T^1\) leaves the taxpayers a larger fraction of aggregate net incomes for lower incomes than does \(T^2\). Again the analysis can be performed in terms of \(q\) or \(p\). A sufficient condition for the concentration curve of \(F_{Y_1-T^1}\) relative to \(F_{Y_2-T^2}\) to lie wholly above the diagonal of the unit square is its strict concavity. Negative taxes are excluded from this analysis.

It is readily seen from Figure 1 that, instead of working with relative concentration curves, we can use the differences of the respective first moment distribution functions. To illustrate, we consider the tax case only; the extension to the net income case is immediate. Suppose the relative concentration curve (with \(F_{T^1}\) on the ordinate and \(F_{T^2}\) on the abscissa) is strictly convex. Note that a concentration curve of \(F_{T^1}\) relative to \(F_{T^2}\) does not cross the diagonal iff \(F_{T^1}(\cdot) - F_{T^2}(\cdot)\) has the same sign for all \(q, p \in (0, 1)\). Then the difference \(F_{T^1} - F_{T^2}\) is negative with a unique minimum. If the relative concentration curve is not convex, but, as in Figure 2, below the diagonal, then the difference of the curves is negative with
multiple minima. If the relative concentration curve crosses the diagonal, the curve differences will be partly negative, partly positive. For a concave relative concentration curve, the curve differences are positive, single peaked for a strictly concave relative concentration curve, and multiple peaked for a non-concave relative concentration curve which is above the diagonal. Hence, the equivalence between relative concentration curves and first-order curve differences is obvious. We shall see that working with curve differences is the more appropriate method for analyzing empirical data.

Uniformly greater tax progression can also be defined in terms of second-order differences of first moment distribution functions.\footnote{12} $T^1$ is then defined to be uniformly more progressive than $T^2$ whenever $F_{Y^1} - F_{T^1} > F_{Y^2} - F_{T^2}$ holds for the whole support. This second notion of uniformly greater tax progression indicates that the difference between the first moment distribution curves, which is due to the influence of taxation, is greater for the income-distribution-cum-tax-schedule $(Y^1, T^1)$ than for $(Y^2, T^2)$. The corresponding condition in terms of net incomes can be written as $F_{Y^1 - T^1} - F_{Y^1} > F_{Y^2 - T^2} - F_{Y^2}$, which means that the difference between the distribution of net incomes and gross incomes is greater for $(Y^1, T^1)$ than for $(Y^2, T^2)$. Therefore, taxation has caused greater equality of net incomes for $(Y^1, T^1)$ as compared with $(Y^2, T^2)$, which is taken as a proxy for greater uniform progression of taxation according to this definition.

**Theorem 1** Assume $0 < T^i[F_i^{-1}(q)] < F_i^{-1}(q) \forall q \in (0, 1), i = 1, 2$, where $F_{T^i}(q)$ is placed on the ordinate and $F_{T^2}(q)$ on the abscissa of the relative concentration curve. Then $(Y^1, T^1)$ is more progressive than $(Y^2, T^2)$ if $\varepsilon^1(q) > \varepsilon^2(q) \forall q \in (0, 1)$, where

$$
\varepsilon^i(q) := \frac{dT^i[F_i^{-1}(q)]}{dT^i[F_i^{-1}(q)]} - q, \ i = 1, 2.
$$

A necessary and sufficient condition is given by the definition of uniformly greater tax progression, applied to $(Y^1, T^1)$ and $(Y^2, T^2)$: $F_{T^1}(q) \leq F_{T^2}(q) \forall q \in [0, 1]$.

In terms of net incomes let $F_{Y^1 - T^1}(q)$ be placed on the ordinate and $F_{Y^2 - T^2}(q)$ on the abscissa of the relative concentration curve. Then $(Y^1, T^1)$ is more progressive than $(Y^2, T^2)$ if $\eta^1(q) < \eta^2(q) \forall q \in (0, 1)$, where

$$
\eta^i(q) := \frac{1 - \frac{dT^i[F_i^{-1}(q)]}{dT^i[F_i^{-1}(q)]}}{F_i^{-1}(q) - T^i[F_i^{-1}(q)]} q, \ i = 1, 2.
$$

\footnote{12}See Lambert (1989, chap. 7) for similar concepts in the case of identical income distributions.
A necessary and sufficient condition is given by the definition of uniformly greater tax progression, applied to \((Y^1, T^1)\) and \((Y^2, T^2)\): \(F_{Y^1 - T^1}(q) \geq F_{Y^2 - T^2}(q) \forall q \in [0, 1]\).

The proof of Theorem 1 is easy: for the two sufficient conditions compute the second derivative of the relative concentration curves. Setting the second derivative positive for a strictly convex relative concentration curve and negative for a strictly concave relative concentration curve (see Seidl (1994, p. 349)) yields the respective elasticities.

\(\varepsilon(q)\) represents the relative increase in tax revenue collected from the fraction \(q\) of the lowest income earners when \(q\) is slightly increased. When \(\varepsilon^1(q)\) and \(\varepsilon^2(q)\) are evaluated at the same value of \(q\), for different income distributions this means that they are evaluated at different income levels and/or in different monetary units. Assume, for instance, that we have \(F_{1}^{-1}(q) = \hat{Y}^1\) and \(F_{2}^{-1}(q) = \hat{Y}^2\). Then we are actually comparing

\[
\varepsilon^1(q) = \frac{dT^1(\hat{Y}^1)}{T^1(\hat{Y}^1)}f_1(\hat{Y}^1)q \quad \text{and} \quad \varepsilon^2(q) = \frac{dT^2(\hat{Y}^2)}{T^2(\hat{Y}^2)}f_2(\hat{Y}^2)q,
\]

where we have usually \(\hat{Y}^1 \neq \hat{Y}^2\), even if we are comparing tax schedules defined for the same monetary unit. Notice the tendency of a more unequal income distribution to make the tax system more progressive, because a smaller \(\hat{Y}\) is associated with \(q\), which means that there is not much income concentrated in the fraction \(q\) of the poorest income earners. Therefore not much tax revenue can be extracted from the lower income strata.

Note that these elasticities are not only cast in terms of tax or net income schedules, but contain elements of both the tax schedules and the income distributions. They are algebraic conditions but, alas, are only sufficient and not necessary conditions. The respective definitions are trivial necessary and sufficient conditions which are helpful for empirical analyses.\(^{13}\)

**Theorem 2** Assume \(0 < T^i[F_{Y^i}^{-1}(p)] < F_{Y^i}^{-1}(p) \forall p \in (0, 1), i = 1, 2\), where \(F_{Y^i}^{-1}(p)\) is placed on the ordinate and \(F_{T^i}^{-1}(p)\) on the abscissa of the relative concentration curve. Then \((Y^1, T^1)\) is more progressive than

\(^{13}\)Although having a necessary and sufficient condition for their analysis in terms of deformed income distributions, viz. isoeelasticity of the deformation functions to warrant independence of the baseline distribution, Dardanoni and Lambert (2002, p. 106) had to concede that isoeelasticity is a rather demanding condition which will hardly be met in the real world. (For this approach see also Footnote 1.) Hence, comparison of tax progression “becomes an empirical question”, which is another impetus for our present work.
\[(Y^2, T^2) \text{ if } \varepsilon^1(p) - \chi^1(p) > \varepsilon^2(p) - \chi^2(p) \forall p \in (0, 1), \text{ where }\]
\[\varepsilon^i(p) := \frac{dT^i[F^{-1}_Y(p)] dF^{-1}_Y(p)}{T^i[F^{-1}_Y(p)]} p, \text{ and } \chi^i(p) := \frac{dF^{-1}_Y}{dp} F^{-1}_Y, i = 1, 2.\]

A necessary and sufficient condition is given by the definition of uniformly greater tax progression, applied to \((Y^1, T^1)\) and \((Y^2, T^2)\): \(F_{T_1}(p) \leq F_{T_2}(p) \forall p \in [0, 1].\)

In terms of net incomes, let \(F^Y_{Y_1-T_\tilde{1}}(p)\) be placed on the ordinate and \(F^Y_{Y_2-T_\tilde{2}}(p)\) on the abscissa of the relative concentration curve. Then \((Y^1, T^1)\) is more progressive than \((Y^2, T^2)\) if \(\eta^1(p) - \chi^1(p) < \eta^2(p) - \chi^2(p) \forall p \in (0, 1), \text{ where }\]
\[\eta^i(p) := \frac{1 - \frac{dT^i[F^{-1}_Y(p)]}{dF^{-1}_Y(p)}}{Y - T_i[F^{-1}_Y(p)]} p, \text{ and } \chi^i(p) := \frac{dF^{-1}_Y}{dp} F^{-1}_Y, i = 1, 2.\]

A necessary and sufficient condition is given by the definition of uniformly greater tax progression, applied to \((Y^1, T^1)\) and \((Y^2, T^2)\): \(F_{Y_1-T_\tilde{1}}(p) \geq F_{Y_2-T_\tilde{2}}(p) \forall p \in [0, 1].\)

Theorem 2 again contains two sufficient and two trivial necessary and sufficient conditions. What we have reasoned after Theorem 1 applies, mutatis mutandis, also for Theorem 2. The only difference is that now the comparison of progression is made in terms of shares of aggregate income instead of in income shares of population strata.

As concerns the sufficient conditions, \(\varepsilon(p) [\eta(p)]\) denotes the tax [residual income] elasticity with respect to \(p\), and \(\chi(p)\) denotes the elasticity of the inverse moment distribution function with respect to \(p\), which captures the influence of the income distribution evaluated at \(p\). When \(\varepsilon^1(p) - \chi^1(p)\) and \(\varepsilon^2(p) - \chi^2(p)\) are evaluated at the same value of \(p\), this means that different \(\tilde{Y}^i\)'s are involved.

The next theorem analyzes greater progression in terms of second-order differences of first moment distribution functions.

**Theorem 3** Assume \(0 < T^i[F^{-1}_Y(q)] < F^{-1}_Y(q) \forall q \in (0, 1), i = 1, 2.\) Then \(F_{Y_1}(q) - F_{T_1}(q) > F_{Y_2}(q) - F_{T_2}(q) > 0 \forall q \in (0, 1),\) if both \(\varepsilon^1(q) \geq \varepsilon^2(q)\) and \(\Psi^1(q) \leq \Psi^2(q) \forall q \in (0, 1),\) where at least one of the two inequality signs has to be strict. Notice that \(\varepsilon^i(q), i = 1, 2,\) is defined as in Theorem 1, and \(\Psi^i(q) := \frac{dT^i[F^{-1}_Y(q)]}{dF^{-1}_Y(q)} q, i = 1, 2,\) denotes the elasticity of the inverse distribution function.

A necessary and sufficient condition is given by the definition of uniformly greater tax progression, applied to \((Y^1, T^1)\) and \((Y^2, T^2)\): \(F_{Y_1}(q) - F_{T_1}(q) \geq F_{Y_2}(q) - F_{T_2}(q) > 0 \forall q \in (0, 1).\)
Moreover, $F_{Y^1}(q) - F_{Y^1-T^1}(q) < F_{Y^2}(q) - F_{Y^2-T^2}(q) < 0 \ \forall \ q \in (0,1)$ if both $\eta^1(q) \leq \eta^2(q)$ and $\Psi^1(q) \geq \Psi^2(q) \ \forall \ q \in (0,1)$, where at least one of the two inequality signs has to be strict. Notice that $\eta^i(q), i = 1, 2$, is defined as in Theorem 1.

A necessary and sufficient condition is given by the definition of uniformly greater tax progression, applied to $(Y^1, T^1)$ and $(Y^2, T^2)$: $F_{Y^1}(q) - F_{Y^1-T^1}(q) \leq F_{Y^2}(q) - F_{Y^2-T^2}(q) < 0 \ \forall \ q \in (0,1)$.

The proof of Theorem 3 is more involved than the proof of Theorem 1 (see Seidl (1994, pp. 352-3)). Note that the algebraic conditions are only sufficient conditions. They contain in their first components elements of both the tax schedule and the income distribution, while their second components refer to the income distributions only. These latter components serve the role of a calibration device to warrant that the tax distributions are not triggered by great discrepancies in the distributions of gross incomes. The necessary and sufficient conditions are again elementary; they are very helpful for empirical analyses.

Theorem 3 concerns comparisons between differences of cumulative curves of gross incomes and taxes and comparisons between differences of cumulative curves of net incomes and gross incomes. If $F_{Y^1}(q)$ is more diminished by subtraction of the tax curve, viz. $F_{T^1}(q)$, than $F_{Y^2}(q)$ is by $F_{T^2}(q)$ for all $q, 0 \leq q \leq 1$, then $(Y^1, T^1)$ is more progressive than $(Y^2, T^2)$. If $F_{Y^1-T^1}(q)$ is more diminished by subtraction of $F_{Y^1}(q)$ than $F_{Y^2-T^2}(q)$ is by $F_{Y^2}(q)$ for all $q, 0 \leq q \leq 1$, then $(Y^1, T^1)$ is more progressive than $(Y^2, T^2)$.

Note that dominance relations of concentrations curves are subrelations of appropriate global inequality measures; of course, the converse does not hold. In this paper, we do not dwell on that; for more details see Seidl (1994, pp. 359-60).

### 3.3 Uniform Tax Progression for Different Income Distributions: Discrete Version

So far empirical comparisons of tax progression have not been made for the uniform measures of tax progression in terms of $q$ or $p$ that allow to compare progression for different income distributions in different countries or different time periods in the same countries. We test the theory developed in the preceding section using the data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). As the LIS data are microdata, we have to re-state all definitions and curves in discrete terms.

As we analyze comparisons of progression of direct taxes on the one hand, and direct taxes plus payroll taxes (mainly employees’ share of social security contributions) on the other, we have to introduce
respective notations. We use \( Y = [Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_n] \) to denote a distribution of pre-tax or gross incomes arranged in nondecreasing order, \( T = [T_1, T_2, \ldots, T_n] \) to denote the distribution of the associated direct taxes, and \( S = [S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_n] \) to denote the distribution of direct taxes plus payroll taxes. \( \mu, \tau, \) and \( \zeta \) denote mean pre-tax or gross income, mean direct taxes, and mean direct taxes plus payroll taxes, respectively. For generic references we will continue to use the terms gross and net incomes. When respective discriminations are needed, the terms pre-tax and post-tax incomes will be used for direct taxes only, and gross and net incomes for analyses of direct taxes plus payroll taxes.

Let \((Y, T)\) denote the income-distribution-cum-tax-schedule for some country or some time period within a country. Let us also define the discrete equivalents of the first moment distribution functions in terms of point coordinates with the first entry being the ordinate, and the second entry being the abscissa of the respective points. For ease of demonstration, \( T \) and \( \tau \) are used as proxies also representing \((T + S)\) and \((\tau + \zeta)\):

\[
F_Y(q_k) := \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} Y_i}{n\mu}, \quad q_k = \frac{k}{n}, \quad k = 0, \ldots, n; \\

F_T(q_k) := \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} T_i}{n\tau}, \quad q_k = \frac{k}{n}, \quad k = 0, \ldots, n; \\

F_{Y-T}(q_k) := \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} (Y_i - T_i)}{n(\mu - \tau)}, \quad q_k = \frac{k}{n}, \quad k = 0, \ldots, n; \\

F^Y_T(p_k) := \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} T_i}{n\tau}, \quad p_k = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} Y_i}{n\mu} \quad k = 0, \ldots, n; \\

F^Y_{Y-T}(p_k) := \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} (Y_i - T_i)}{n(\mu - \tau)}, \quad p_k = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} Y_i}{n\mu} \quad k = 0, \ldots, n.
\]

In formulae (11) to (15), whenever in the summation sign index \( k \) is zero (and therefore, \( i > k \)), we set the respective value in the function equal to zero, which allows us to include the origin into our curves. Strictly speaking, both the right-hand side and the left-hand side of (11) to (15) are functions of \( k \). Hence we consider the range of the right-hand-side function as the domain of the left-hand-side function, which gives us the discrete versions of the first-moment distribution functions. For all curves in terms of \( q \) we use the ranking according to gross incomes, as we have to apply that necessarily also for the curves in terms of
Here, (11) denotes a discrete equivalent of the Lorenz income curve, (12), and (13) denote the discrete equivalents of the concentration curves of taxes and net incomes, respectively. (14) and (15) denote the discrete equivalents of the concentration curves of taxes and net incomes for the income shares $p^i_k$. These mappings are just generic; of course, different situations $(Y^1, T^1)$ and $(Y^2, T^2)$ have different components and different numbers of income recipients. 14

Concentration curves may be different from Lorenz curves because of re-ranking phenomena. Hence, before proceeding further, we have to dwell on the re-ranking problem which we assumed away for our theoretical analyses, but which haunts all empirical analyses of distributional problems. For theoretical analyses, the assumption of co-monotonicity of gross incomes, taxes, payroll taxes, and net incomes is self-evident: higher gross incomes should imply higher taxes, higher payroll taxes, and higher net incomes. This means that the ordering of gross incomes coincides with the orderings of taxes, payroll taxes, and net incomes. Hence, only one ordering applies to all designs and we can work with Lorenz curves (or their discrete-case equivalents) throughout. However, in the world of empirical data, re-ranking is ubiquitous. Due to different family structures, different tax allowances, different income compositions, and different transfer incomes, households with higher incomes may end up with smaller taxes or, else, with smaller net incomes than households with smaller gross incomes.

Hence, re-ranking opens up Pandora’s box of possible other orderings. For instance, for expression (12) we can arrange the entries in nondecreasing order of the taxes instead of arranging them according to the order of their associated gross incomes. In (13), net incomes can be arranged in nondecreasing order instead of arranging them according to their associated gross incomes. Then we could work with Lorenz curves throughout instead of using concentration curves. Indeed, in the presence of re-ranking, concentration curves would be closer to the diagonal than Lorenz curves, or may even cross the diagonal.

For the sake of a uniform methodology we decided in favor of ordering all entries according to gross incomes for our empirical analyses. To illustrate, consider the analysis in terms of the aggregate shares $p_k$. Observe that the mapping for gross incomes boils down to $F^Y_Y(p_k) = p_k$, i.e., it consists just of points on the diagonal of the unit square. Had we ordered the entries in formula (14) not in terms of gross incomes, but in terms of taxes, i.e., had we set $p_k = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} T_i}{n_y}$, then we would again have only gotten points on the diagonal of the unit square. The same applies if we had ordered the $p_k$’s according to the net incomes

14 Note that for the discrete version we continue to use superscripts to refer to the two different vectors of taxes and incomes, each representing the situation as a whole, while subscripts are used for vector components.
in formula (15). On the other hand, analyses in terms of aggregate shares are sensible from an economic point of view. If from the lowest income recipients whose aggregate income amounts to 20 percent of total income, 5 percent of total tax revenue is collected, then at \( p_k^1 = 0.2 \), \( F_{Y^1T^1}(p_k^1) = 0.05 \), and \( (Y^1, T^1) \) is more progressive than \( (Y^2, T^2) \) if, e.g., \( p_k^2 = 0.2 \) (or its respective interpolation point on the second moment distribution curve) and \( F_{Y^2T^2} = 0.10 \). If the same pattern holds for all \( 0 < p_k^j < 1 \) (or for the respective interpolation points of the curves constructed by connecting neighboring points by straight lines), then \( (Y^1, T^1) \) is uniformly more progressive than \( (Y^2, T^2) \). The same applies \textit{mutatis mutandis} to the net incomes. Hence, the request for comparability of analyses of tax progression in terms of the \( p_k \)'s on the one hand and the \( q_k \)'s on the other suggests that we should also use the gross-income rankings for our analyses in terms of \( q \).

Beyond that, there is still another reason for using gross-income rankings throughout: neither taxes nor net incomes exist in isolation. Instead, they derive their existence from their association with gross incomes. Hence, this serves as an additional argument to treat them according to the ordering of gross incomes for our analyses in terms of the \( q_k \)'s. Finally, using EUROMOD data, Peichl and Schäfer (2008, pp. 9-12) have shown that the difference between the Gini and the concentration coefficients of net incomes are rather small and re-ranking as measured by the Reynolds-Smolensky progression measure is far from dramatic. Hence, the possible error from ignoring re-ranking is quite small.

Another aspect of the re-ranking problem concerns equivalized incomes. Our analyses are carried out in terms of both household and equivalized incomes. The latter are derived from the former by applying equivalence scales to take into account economies of scale in large households.\(^{15}\) For our analyses we applied the equivalence scales as proposed by LIS: to derive equivalized incomes, we divided the household incomes by \( m^\alpha \), where \( m \) denotes the number of household members, and \( \alpha, 0 \leq \alpha \leq 1 \), denotes a scale parameter; mainly we followed the LIS practice of taking \( \alpha = 0.5 \), but in order to investigate the influence of the scale parameter, we also tried \( \alpha = 0.25 \) and \( \alpha = 0.75 \) for selected cases.\(^{16}\)


\(^{16}\)Buhmann et al. (1988, pp. 119-122) investigated 34 equivalence scales which were proposed by various researchers, and found that the Luxembourg equivalence formula fits them well for various values of \( \alpha \) for four representative groups of proposed equivalence scales. Buhmann et al. (1988, p. 128) also observed that income inequality first decreases and then increases as \( \alpha \) increases, viz. inequality is an U-shaped function of \( \alpha \); poverty decreases as \( \alpha \) increases (p. 132). For more
To illustrate, consider an income distribution comprising two households: \([1000,2500]\). Suppose that the first one is a single-person household, while the second one is a four-person household. Then, if we take \(\alpha = 0.5\), the equivalized income distribution becomes \([1000,1250,1250,1250,1250]\); however, taking \(\alpha = 0.75\) gives us the equivalized income distribution \([884,884,884,884,1000]\). Hence, both the household structure\(^{17}\) and the choice of the scale parameter determine the shape of the equivalized income distribution. In our analysis, equivalized incomes were always arranged in nondecreasing order of equivalized gross incomes.

After the digression on re-ranking, let us return to the concepts of uniformly more progressive tax schedules. Recall that we defined \((Y^1,T^1)\) to be more progressive than \((Y^2,T^2)\) if the tax schedule \(T^1\) associated with the income distribution \(Y^1\) collects for all values of \(q\) or \(p\) no greater fraction of taxes than does tax schedule \(T^2\) associated with the income distribution \(Y^2\). Alternatively, we defined greater progression of \((Y^1,T^1)\) than \((Y^2,T^2)\) if \((Y^1,T^1)\) leaves the taxpayers for all \(q\) or \(p\) no less a fraction of post-tax net incomes than does \((Y^2,T^2)\). Finally, we defined greater progression if the difference of the cumulative curves of gross incomes and taxes for \((Y^1,T^1)\) is not smaller than the difference of the cumulative curves of gross incomes and taxes for \((Y^2,T^2)\) for all \(q\), or when the difference of the cumulative curves of gross and net incomes of \((Y^1,T^1)\) is not greater than the difference of the cumulative curves of gross incomes and taxes of \((Y^2,T^2)\) for all \(q\).\(^{18}\)

For the continuous analyses we expressed the first two concepts in terms of relative concentration curves, and the second two in terms of second-order curve differences. More progression is present if the relative concentration curve does not cut the diagonal within the unit square, or if the second-order curve differences do not cut the abscissa within the unit interval. For the discrete analysis, it is more convenient to use curve differences quite generally.\(^{19}\) As the respective “curves” in the discrete case consist of finitely elaborate work see Coulter et al. (1992), Banks and Johnson (1994), Jenkins and Cowell (1994), Faik (1995), and Cowell and Mercader-Prats (1999).

\(^{17}\)Buhmann et al. (1988, p. 127) argue that equivalence scales have greater effect in case of different household structures associated with the actual income distributions to be compared; greater households, in particular, influence the results. Peichl et al. (2009a,b) observed that part of the increase in income inequality in Germany in terms of equivalized incomes is due to the trend in the direction of smaller households in the last decades.

\(^{18}\)See also Footnote 8, which applies to the discrete case as well.

\(^{19}\)The case of a relative concentration curve being below (or above) the diagonal in the interior of the unit square is equivalent to a positive (negative) difference of the generating curves within the unit interval. Recall that a concentration curve of \(F_{T^1}(\cdot)\) relative to \(F_{T^2}(\cdot)\) does not cross the diagonal iff \(F_{T^1}(\cdot) - F_{T^2}(\cdot)\) has the same sign for all \(q,p \in (0,1)\). The proof is trivial and therefore omitted. Note that this applies analogously also to net incomes.
many points, we have to confine ourselves to the comparison of these points. In the general case, as defined in formulae (11) to (15), we encounter the difficulty that the $q_k$'s and the $p_k$'s need not coincide for $(Y^1, T^1)$ and $(Y^2, T^2)$, so that we may have $k^1$'s for which there are no equal $k^2$'s, and vice versa. This can be handled in a more tedious way by comparing $q_k^1$ with the equivalent point on the interpolation segment on the second curve. For reasons to be explained in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 we used grouped data with the same number of quantiles. Before that, we explain our measures of comparisons of progression in terms of individual data.

As a mnemonic device we have arranged all definitions of greater progression in such a way that progression dominance is expressed as nonnegative curve differences and being progression dominated as nonpositive curve differences. Hence, we have:

**Definition 1** $(Y^1, T^1)$ is more [less] progressive than $(Y^2, T^2)$ iff $F_{T^2}(q_k) - F_{T^1}(q_k)$ is nonnegative [nonpositive] for all $q_k$, $0 \leq q_k \leq 1$.

**Definition 2** $(Y^1, T^1)$ is more [less] progressive than $(Y^2, T^2)$ iff $F_{Y^2}^{T^2}(p_k) - F_{Y^1}^{T^1}(p_k)$ is nonnegative [nonpositive] for all $p_k$, $0 \leq p_k \leq 1$.

**Definition 3** $(Y^1, T^1)$ is more [less] progressive than $(Y^2, T^2)$ iff $F_{Y^1 - T^1}(q_k) - F_{Y^2 - T^2}(q_k)$ is nonnegative [nonpositive] for all $q_k$, $0 \leq q_k \leq 1$.

**Definition 4** $(Y^1, T^1)$ is more [less] progressive than $(Y^2, T^2)$ iff $F_{Y^1 - T^1}^{Y^2}(p_k) - F_{Y^2 - T^2}^{Y^1}(p_k)$ is nonnegative [nonpositive] for all $p_k$, $0 \leq p_k \leq 1$.

**Definition 5** $(Y^1, T^1)$ is more [less] progressive than $(Y^2, T^2)$ iff $[F_{Y^1}(q_k) - F_{Y^2}(q_k)] - [F_{T^1}(q_k) - F_{T^2}(q_k)]$ is nonnegative [nonpositive] for all $q_k$, $0 \leq q_k \leq 1$.

**Definition 6** $(Y^1, T^1)$ is more [less] progressive than $(Y^2, T^2)$ iff $[F_{Y^1 - T^1}(q_k) - F_{Y^2 - T^2}(q_k)] - [F_{Y^1}(q_k) - F_{Y^2}(q_k)]$ is nonnegative [nonpositive] for all $q_k$, $0 \leq q_k \leq 1$.

Obviously, Definition 1 matches the necessary and sufficient conditions of the first part of Theorem 1. Definition 2 matches the necessary and sufficient condition of the first part of Theorem 2. Definition 3 matches the necessary and sufficient condition of the second part of Theorem 1. Definition 4 matches the necessary and sufficient condition of the second part of Theorem 2. Definition 5 matches the necessary
and sufficient condition of the first part of Theorem 3. Note that Definition 5 comes from the formulation that \((Y^1, T^1)\) is more [less] progressive than \((Y^2, T^2)\) iff \([F_{Y^1}(q_k) - F_{T^1}(q_k)] \geq [F_{Y^2}(q_k) - F_{T^2}(q_k)]\) \([\leq\) for less progressive] for all \(q_k, 0 \leq q_k \leq 1\). Definition 6 matches the necessary and sufficient condition of the second part of Theorem 3. Note that Definition 6 comes from the formulation that \((Y^1, T^1)\) is more [less] progressive than \((Y^2, T^2)\) iff \([F_{Y^1-T^1}(q_k) - F_{Y^1}(q_k)] \geq [F_{Y^2-T^2}(q_k) - F_{Y^2}(q_k)]\) \([\leq\) for less progressive] for all \(q_k, 0 \leq q_k \leq 1\).

### 3.4 Heuristics of Progression Comparisons

#### 3.4.1 Heuristics of the First Moment Distribution Functions

To provide some intuition of the proposed method of progression comparisons, we assume in this section that we have the same number of taxpayers \(n\) in both situations to be compared and deal with the individual data of the taxpayers. Hence, in formulae (11) to (15) \(k\) runs from 0 to \(n\). Then, for the same \(k\) the left-hand sides of (12) and (14) have the same value, and the left-hand sides of (13) and (15) have the same value. What makes \(F_T(q_k)\) and \(F_T^Y(p_k)\) as well as \(F_{Y-T}(q_k)\) and \(F_{Y-T}^Y(p_k)\) different are the second components of their respective points. For \(F_T(q_k)\) and \(F_{Y-T}(q_k)\) they are \(\frac{k}{n} = q_k\), whereas for \(F_T^Y(p_k)\) and \(F_{Y-T}^Y(p_k)\) they are \(\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} Y_i}{n\mu} = p_k\), i.e. \(F_Y(q_k)\). Now \(F_Y(q_k) \leq q_k\), since \(F_Y(q_k)\) is the Lorenz curve of gross incomes. Hence, the \(p\)-curves lie North-West of the respective \(q\)-curves.

For proportional taxes with rate \(t, 1 > t > 0\), we have

\[
\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} T_i}{n\tau} = \frac{t \sum_{i=1}^{k} Y_i}{tn\mu} = \frac{(1-t) \sum_{i=1}^{k} Y_i}{(1-t)n\mu} = F_Y(q_k).
\]

Hence, both \(F_T(q_k)\) and \(F_{Y-T}(q_k)\) are equal to the Lorenz curve of gross incomes \(F_Y(q_k)\), and both \(F_T(p_k)\) and \(F_{Y-T}(p_k)\) are equal to the diagonal of the unit square.

Suppose co-monotonicity holds. Then we have for progressive taxes (i.e., \(\frac{dT}{dY} \geq \frac{T}{Y}\))

\[
q_k \geq F_{Y-T}(q_k) \geq F_Y(q_k) \geq F_T(q_k)
\]

and

\[
F_{Y-T}^Y(p_k) \geq p_k \geq F_{T}^Y(p_k).
\]

Inequality (16) is obvious. To show inequality (17), we consider whether

\[
\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} (Y_i - T_i)}{n(\mu - \tau)} \geq \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} Y_i}{n\mu}
\]
holds. After some re-arrangement this gives us

\begin{equation}
\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} T_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{k} Y_i} \leq \frac{\tau}{\mu}.
\end{equation}

Because of a progressive tax schedule \( \varepsilon > 1 \), which means that \( T_i \) increases faster than \( Y_i \) as \( i \) increases. As the left-hand side of (18) increases to \( \frac{\tau}{\mu} \), it cannot exceed \( \frac{\tau}{\mu} \) for \( k \leq n \). This establishes the first inequality in (17).

The second part of inequality (17) comes from checking whether

\[ \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} Y_i}{n\mu} \geq \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k} T_i}{n\tau} \]

holds. It is immediately seen that this reduces to (18) and, thus, establishes the second part of inequality (17).

Hence, for co-monotonicity and progressive taxation \( F_{Y-T}^Y(p_k) \) lies above and \( F_T^Y(p_k) \) below the diagonal of the unit square. For co-monotonicity and increasing, but regressive, taxation the opposite inequality signs hold in the inequalities (16) and (17).

When re-ranking occurs, co-monotonicity is violated, and the resulting concentration curves below the diagonal exhibit less curvature, and the concentration curves above the diagonal [this is \( F_{y-T}^Y(p_k) \)] more curvature, i.e., the first group moves closer to the diagonal and the second further away from the diagonal. Although cases such that the inequalities (16) and (17) are violated may be constructed, they hold in most cases for empirical data. Incidentally, Peichl and Schäfer (2008, pp. 9-12) found that the re-ranking effects are not spectacular.

### 3.4.2 Heuristics of Uniformly Greater Progression

Concerning Definitions 1 to 6, for empirical data the net incomes are more equally distributed than the gross incomes, and gross incomes are more equally distributed than taxes. This means that the \( q \)-curves for net incomes exhibit the least curvature, followed by the \( q \)-curves for gross incomes, with the \( q \)-curves for taxes having the most curvature. As to the \( p \)-curves, they become the diagonal for gross incomes, a convex curve for taxes, and a concave curve for net incomes.

**Uniformly Greater Tax Progression: Formally Stated**

Definition 1 defines \((Y^1, T^1)\) as more progressive than \((Y^2, T^2)\), if the first moment generating functions with respect to \( q \) of \( T^1 \) lies below that
of $T^2$. The degree of higher progression can be measured by taking the difference between these curves, which in turn can be captured by the area under the curve $F_{T^2}(q_k) - T_{T^1}(q_k)$. Definition 2 does the same for the first moment generating functions of taxes with respect to $p$. Because of our above observation we would expect a smaller difference on average for the $p$-curves than for the $q$-curves.

According to Definition 3, $(Y^1, T^1)$ is more progressive than $(Y^2, T^2)$, if the first moment generating function with respect to $q_k$ of the net incomes $(Y^1 - T^1)$ lies above that of $(Y^2 - T^2)$. That is, for each quantile $q_k$ (except at the end points) the quantile’s fraction of the total net income is higher under $(Y^1, T^1)$ than under $(Y^2, T^2)$. A similar pattern holds for Definition 4, which defines $(Y^1, T^1)$ as more progressive than $(Y^2, T^2)$, if the first moment generating function with respect to $p_k$ of the net incomes $(Y^1 - T^1)$ lies above that of $(Y^2 - T^2)$. This means that for each gross income quantile $p_k$ (except at the end points) the quantile’s fraction of the total net income is higher under $(Y^1, T^1)$ than under $(Y^2, T^2)$. Note that, in contrast to the $q$-curves, this means that, because of inequality (17), $F_{Y^2 - T^2}(p_k)$ lies further apart from the diagonal than does $F_{Y^1 - T^1}(p_k)$ for all $p_k$’s if $(Y^1, T^1)$ is more progressive.

Definition 5 uses the difference between $F_Y(q_k)$ and $F_T(q_k)$ as the basis for comparisons of progression. If for $(Y^1, T^1)$ this difference exceeds the one for $(Y^2, T^2)$ for all $q$’s (except at the end points), then $(Y^1, T^1)$ is considered more progressive than $(Y^2, T^2)$. Definition 6 takes an analogous approach using $F_{Y - T}(q_k)$ and $F_Y(q_k)$.

### Uniformly Greater Tax Progression: Interaction of Tax Schedules and Income Distributions

We employed Definitions 1 to 6 to make comparisons of tax progression. Our approach differs from the conventional one by considering the case of different tax schedules and different income distributions for the situations to be compared. This means that both components of tax progression interact.

Starting with Definition 1, suppose $F_{Y^2}(q_k) \geq F_{Y^1}(q_k) \forall q_k$ with at least one strict inequality sign, and suppose that we have proportional taxes in both situations. Then the first moment distribution functions of incomes translate immediately to $F_{T^2}(q_k) \geq F_{T^1}(q_k) \forall q_k$ with at least one inequality sign strict. This implies that $(Y^1, T^1)$ is, according to Definition 1, considered as being more progressive than $(Y^2, T^2)$, although both taxes are proportional. Hence, the more unequal distribution of gross incomes $Y^1$ causes $(Y^1, T^1)$ to be more progressive than $(Y^2, T^2)$. This is simply the consequence of allowing the income distribution an equal influence as the tax schedule on the determination of the progression of $(Y, T)$. In other words, the distribution of gross incomes may reinforce or attenuate the effects of progression of
the pure tax schedule. For instance, if a slightly progressive tax schedule is associated with a rather unequal distribution of gross incomes, the concentration curve of the taxes may well be dominated by the concentration curves of rather progressive taxes associated with a more equal distribution of gross incomes.\textsuperscript{20}

Definition 2 precludes a proportional tax from becoming more progressive than another proportional tax, since $F_Y(p_k)$ happens to be the diagonal. Hence, $F_T(p_k)$ lies below the diagonal for progressive tax schedules. But the distribution of gross incomes interferes also for Definition 2 with the tax schedule and may reinforce or attenuate the progression of the pure tax schedule.

The influence of the distribution of gross incomes is even more pronounced for Definition 3 than for Definition 1 because gross incomes usually have a higher impact on net incomes than on the associated taxes. A more equal distribution of net incomes may result from a progressive tax schedule and/or from a more equal distribution of gross incomes. Only if the income distribution is the same can we attribute greater progression to the tax schedule alone. The other end of the gamut is established by the case of a proportional tax for which greater progression is wholly determined by the distribution of gross incomes. In effect, the influence of the distribution of gross incomes is at most pronounced for the net incomes, which, in turn governs the behavior of Definition 3.

Definition 4 precludes a proportional tax from becoming more progressive than another proportional tax, since $F_Y(p_k)$ is equal to $F_T(p_k)$, which is the diagonal. For progressive tax schedules, $F_Y(p_k)$ lies, according to (17), above the diagonal. Comparisons of tax progression are again heavily influenced by the distribution of gross incomes. This effect is even more pronounced for Definition 4 than for Definition 2.

Re-arranging Definitions 5 and 6, we have the terms $[F_Y(q_k) - F_T(q_k)]$ and $[F_Y(q_k) - F_Y(q_k)]$, respectively. Recall that these terms are zero for proportional taxes. Hence, Definitions 5 and 6 become zero for proportional tax schedules. In a way, Definitions 5 and 6 calibrate for the gross income distributions, as they just consider the deviations of the first moment distribution of the gross incomes from the first moment distributions of the taxes or net incomes, respectively. Hence, the influence of the distributions of gross incomes is partly neutralized. Moreover, at first sight Definitions 5 and 6, as they were formulated above, may invoke the wrong conclusion that they provide a separation between the influence of the income

\textsuperscript{20}Note that this is merely a possibility. Taxes are levied on absolute rather than relative incomes. Therefore, considerations beyond proportional taxation are subject to speculation.
distribution on the one hand, and the tax schedule on the other. But this impression is not correct, since
the terms \( F_T(q_k) \) and \( F_Y-T(q_k) \) are by themselves influenced by the respective gross income distributions.
This is also evidenced from Theorems 1 to 3, which show us that the tax schedules and the income dis-
tributions are intrinsically amalgamated so that a straightforward separation of their influence is not at
hand.\(^{21}\) Hence, Definitions 5 and 6 may be considered a second-best approach at separating the influence
of the distributions of gross incomes and tax schedules. Here also the tax terms and the net income terms
depend on the income distribution, which prevents a clear-cut separation between these influences.

4 Data and Results

Our empirical investigation addresses several problems:

Firstly, recall that the method of comparing tax progression which we proposed determines not a
complete, but only a partial ordering. This provokes the question whether it is of major relevance because
it might be that the tax schedules associated with their respective income distributions are so involved
that only few clear-cut dominance relations emerge. In other words: is our method of comparison of tax
progression in the real world only a will-o’-the-wisp, or can it command major occurrence?

Secondly, if our first question is responded in the affirmative, what is the relative performance of the
six proposed measures of the comparison of tax progression? Are there interrelationships? What are the
economic message and content of these methods?

Thirdly, what is the relative importance of sufficient and necessary conditions of comparisons of tax

\(^{21}\) For the sufficient conditions, Theorems 2 and 3 may at first sight impart the impression of separate influences of the
elasticities of the tax schedules or net incomes on the one hand, and the elasticities \( \chi(p) \) and \( \Psi(q) \) on the other. However,
this impression obscures that the elasticities \( \varepsilon(\cdot) \) and \( \eta(\cdot) \) themselves depend in intricate ways on the income distributions
(which applies also to Theorem 1). [Note that things are different for the analysis in terms of income. For the sufficient
conditions in terms of taxes and net incomes we observe the sum of the elasticity of the density function of the income
distribution on the one hand, and the tax elasticity or the residual income elasticity on the other; see Seidl (1994, pp. 347-8).
However, this analysis applies only to cases of identical monetary units and identical support of the income distributions
involved.] The work of Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) may also be viewed under the aspect of separating tax schedules and
income distributions. These authors employ deformation functions to mimic the income distribution of the other country
to be compared. However, this possible way of decomposition works only for isoelastic deformation functions to secure
independence of the baseline distribution (see also Footnotes 1 and 13).
progression? For which fraction of greater tax progression the relative concentration curves would be strictly convex or concave, and for which they would just not cross the diagonal of the unit square without being strictly convex or concave? If the respective elasticity conditions do not hold, can we safely assume that greater tax progression is unlikely or can we expect it to be rather common?

Fourthly, what is the pattern of comparisons of tax progression when dominance relations do not hold? Do we mainly encounter bifurcate or more intricate progression patterns? Is there a change of the progression pattern at a unique threshold, or do we have a whole series of changes of the progression relations?

Our analyses are carried out for both household data and equivalized data. We used the respective data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database (see LIS (2010)). We mainly focus on international comparisons of tax progression, but also carry out intertemporal comparisons of tax progression for selected countries. Furthermore, we study the effect of the Luxembourg equivalence scale parameter. To address these and related questions, we need household data for both gross and net incomes. In addition to that, for intertemporal comparisons for each country we required the data from at least three recent survey periods ("waves" in LIS terminology; in particular, we used waves III up to VI if the respective data allowed). Data sets showing gross incomes, direct taxes, payroll taxes, and net incomes were available just for 15 countries out of which we took 13, representing in our view the most salient ones. As a shorthand terminology we will use "taxes" to refer either to direct taxes or to direct taxes plus payroll taxes.

We will start with a short description of handling the LIS data, then will report six tables with pairwise progression comparisons for Definitions 1 to 6, followed by comments on six tables with summary results. Then we will analyze sixteen selected graphs for progression comparison related to comparing Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as comparing Germany and Sweden, in terms of household incomes with direct taxes and direct taxes plus payroll taxes, and in terms of equivalized data for direct taxes and direct taxes plus payroll taxes. To provide an overview of our findings for international progression comparisons, we will present Hasse diagrams. Finally, we provide examples of intertemporal progression comparisons and sensitivity results with respect to the parameter of the Luxembourg equivalence scale.
4.1 Handling LIS Data

Our empirical analysis resorts to micro data drawn from the LIS (2010) database. It is a cross-national data archive located in Luxembourg.\textsuperscript{22} Currently it includes panel data from more than 30 countries, most of which are OECD member states (see LIS (2010)). The data sets are organized into “waves” of about five years each, starting with Wave I in 1980 and the most recent being Wave VI (around 2004). The micro data from the different surveys is harmonized and standardized in order to facilitate comparative research. For many countries, however, only a limited number of waves is available, and even if a data set is available, not all income variables are included. In particular, gross incomes, direct taxes and payroll taxes are available only for 15 countries, of which we used 13 in our study.\textsuperscript{23}

Table 1 gives a summary of the countries and waves used. The countries are listed according to the country codes which were used to access the data sets. Columns III to VI list the years to which the data sets, included in the respective waves, refer to. For international comparisons, we took Wave V (around 2000) because of its relative recency and as maximizing the number of available country data. We also included France, but due to data availability, we had to rely on wave 1994. Poland’s Wave III data set was not included as we deem it being too close to the fall of the Iron Curtain.

Within the data sets, at the household level LIS reports, inter alia, gross income (GI), disposable net income (DPI), income taxes (V11) and mandatory payroll taxes (PAYROLL). In what follows, we employ two different net income definitions. Net income is defined either in accordance with LIS as DPI=GI−(V11+PAYROLL), or it is redefined by us as GI−V11, i.e., the analysis is based on taxes only.\textsuperscript{24} It should be noted, however, that V11 in some cases already includes social security contributions if these were lumped together in the original data set before adding it to LIS. Furthermore, some countries like

\textsuperscript{22}For more information about the LIS database see Smeeding et al. (1985), Smeeding (2004), and Atkinson (2004). For illustrative examples of applications of the LIS database see, e.g., Allegrezza et al. (2004), Bardasi (2004), Bronchetti and Sullivan (2003), Gornick (2004), Förster and Vleminckx (2004), and Mahler and Jesuit (2006).

\textsuperscript{23}Israel and Taiwan were not included, Israel due to the statistically unclear status of the occupied territories, Taiwan due to the ongoing reform of the social security system.

\textsuperscript{24}This means that taxes include so-called clawbacks. i.e., taxes which return to government part of the transfer. Prasad and Deng (2009, p. 439) remark: “This means that where transfers are high, taxes on transfers may be high, but this is not ‘true’ tax, simply a reduction in the amount of transfer given. To achieve a measure of true tax paid, then, the amount of clawbacks should be subtracted from the total tax paid.” However, we opine that clawbacks are an integral part of the tax system. In contrast to Prasad and Deng (2009) we also do not consider indirect taxes in our investigations.
Table 1: LIS Data Sets Used for International and Intertemporal Comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>ch</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>de</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>fr</td>
<td>./.</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>nl</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>pl</td>
<td>./.</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>se</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table notes.* Boldfaced years were used for international comparisons. A dash means that a gross income data set is not available. ./. means that the respective wave was not used though available.

Denmark do not have separate mandatory social security contributions for most of the population. In these cases PAYROLL stays empty and we cannot distinguish between taxes and payroll.

The analysis was carried out at the household level as well as the level of equivalized data. The former analysis rests upon the original data provided by LIS, weighed by household weights (HWEIGHT). These weights are intended to secure representativeness of the results for the whole population of a country. However, the representativeness of the current study is somewhat reduced by the fact that up to 7 percent of the households listed in each data set had to be truncated to warrant nonnegative gross and net
incomes,\footnote{Some data sets are censored in the way that negative incomes are reported as zeros. Hence, we decided to leave all entries out which are nonpositive with respect to either GI or DPI or both.} nonnegative taxes and payroll taxes. For the individual-based analysis, equivalized data was used. First, all monetary variables were multiplied by the Luxembourg equivalence scale which is $m^{-\alpha}$, where $m$ represents the number of household members (D4). If not otherwise stated, $\alpha$ was set equal to 0.5. We also performed sensitivity analyses for some countries with $\alpha = \{0.25, 0.5, 0.75\}$. Second, household weights had to be replaced by person weights which were computed as $D4 \times \text{HWEIGHT}$.

In order to access the LIS data, we wrote a program in SPSS that computed the values of $F_Y(q)$, $F_T(q)$, and so on, at 20 equally spaced quantiles of the unit interval and printed back these results for every data set (country and year), for taxes and taxes plus payroll taxes for both household and equivalized data. We had to use this approach because direct access to LIS data is not permitted. We then wrote a Visual Basic macro to facilitate processing of the LIS output offline.

4.2 Heuristics of Progression Comparisons for Grouped Data

Our formulae and definitions presented in Section 3.3 and discussed in Section 3.4 were cast in terms of individual data. Although this approach appears \textit{prima facie} as the proper one, we could not apply it to our empirical work because, first, direct access to LIS data is not permitted (which would have precluded us from working offline), and, second, the numbers of taxpayers in the populations to be compared are typically different. This last feature would have necessitated tedious ad hoc interpolation procedures for all pairwise comparisons. To deal with both issues in a more expedient way, we employed the following approach using grouped data.

We divided the unit interval into 20 shares, i.e., taking five-percent steps\footnote{As compared to other empirical work, this is a rather fine grid. Sala-i-Martin (2006, pp. 355 and 357), for instance, had to work with quintiles and had to resort to widespread data interpolations for carrying out his ambitious study. Bishop et al. (1991a, p. 464) worked with deciles for their construction of Lorenz curves, arguing that “increasing the number of quantiles does not necessarily improve the quality of the overall test” (p. 476, Footnote 5).} as equally spaced quantiles for $q$ in terms of population shares and for $p$ in terms of income shares. This assumption implies that the respective transformed indices $j$ coincide for all respective situations to be compared in formulae (11) to (15), that is $j = 0, 1, \ldots, 20$. For our work with LIS data this approach has the decisive advantage that we are able to quickly process the data for all 13 countries at the LIS server (the critical time consuming
part of our computations) and then analyze the results offline.

For the procedure used we started arranging the raw data (taxes and associated net incomes) in our sample in the increasing order of the associated gross incomes; for equivalized incomes the data were re-arranged in the increasing order of equivalized gross incomes. Next, we divided the population support into 20 equally spaced five-percent groups for the analysis in terms of population quantiles $q$, and divided the gross income support into 20 equally spaced five-percent groups for the analysis in terms of income quantiles $p$. Then we took the respective shares of aggregate taxes, gross and net incomes associated with these five-percent quantiles. Thus we obtained the values for $q_j$, $p_j$, $F_Y(q_j)$, $F_T(q_j)$, $F_{Y-T}(q_j)$, $F_Y(p_j)$, and $F_{Y-T}(p_j)$ for our grouped data, where $j = 0, 1, \ldots, 20$.

But the curves for grouped data deviate from the curves for individual data in several respects. For individual data, as we observed in Section 3.4, if we have the same number of income recipients and (for the same value of $k$) the same partial sums for both the $q$-curve and the $p$-curve, then we have the same corresponding values on either curve’s ordinate, hence the curves differ only by their corresponding values on the abscissa. For grouped data, we apparently have the same equally distanced quantiles on the abscissa; therefore, the $q$-curve and the $p$-curve differ with respect to their corresponding values on the ordinate.

Consider now the $q$ and $p$ curves for taxes for grouped data. For the lower income strata, the five-percent quantiles contain more taxpayers in terms of $p$ than in terms of $q$. In turn, this implies also more relative tax revenue for the $p$-curve as compared with the $q$-curve. Hence, for the lower income strata we have $F_Y(p_j) \geq F_T(q_j)$ for $p_j = q_j$. This means that the tax revenue associated with upper quantiles is smaller in terms of $p$ than in terms of $q$. Hence, the $p$-curve for the taxes has a steeper slope than the $q$-curve for the lower quantiles and a flatter slope for the upper quantiles. But the $q$-curve can never cut the $p$-curve from below in the interior of the unit square. This is easily seen: obviously we have for the gross incomes $F_Y(q) \leq p = F_Y(p)$ for $q = p$. Hence, for $q = p$ the gross income shares according to $q$ can never exceed the gross income share according to $p$. This implies for a progressive tax schedule that $F_T(q) \leq F_T(p)$ for $q = p$, so that the $q$-curve can never cross the $p$-curve from below. Moreover, neither curve crosses the diagonal.

Consider the $q$ and $p$ curves for net incomes for grouped data. For the $q$-curves, basically the same reasoning applies as to Lorenz curves$^{27}$ because the net income shares increase for increasing quantiles.

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$^{27}$See Gastwirth and Glauberman (1976) for errors in estimating Lorenz curves when grouped data are used instead of
Hence, \( F_{Y-T}(q_j) \) lies below the diagonal. For the \( p \)-curves, basically the same reasoning applies as for the analysis of inequality (18). For the individual data we can define an increasing series \( k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_{20} \), such that

\[
\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k_j} Y_i}{n\mu} - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k_j-1} Y_i}{n\mu} \simeq 0.05, \quad j = 1, \ldots, 20,
\]
due to the fineness of the LIS data. Replace now \( k_j \) by \( j \) and

\[
\left[ \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k_j} (Y_i - T_i)}{n(\mu - \tau)} - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k_j-1} (Y_i - T_i)}{n(\mu - \tau)} \right] \text{ by } F_{Y-T}(p_j),
\]
then (17) translates into our grouped data and, hence, inequality (18) translates into our grouped data as well.

This means that our analyses are carried out for Definitions 1 to 6 in terms of grouped data for \( q_j \) and \( p_j \), where \( j = 0, \ldots, 20 \).

Separation of tax progression with respect to the influence of the income distribution on the one hand and the tax schedule on the other was discussed in section 3.4.2. As concerns empirical data, we have to add another problem. Even for the case of identical monetary units, identical support of the income distribution, and confinement to the sufficient conditions, we would need the exact tax schedule to disentangle the influence of the income distribution and the tax schedule. However, the nominal tax schedule would not suffice for this purpose. We would have to capture also the administration of a going tax schedule. All tax codes contain many tax benefits, itemized deductions from the tax base, etc. While these instances are captured by the real microdata of taxation, they are not captured by the nominal tax schedule. Yet they constitute a major element of real tax progression. This was also one of our reasons to use the LIS data instead of simulated data, such as, e.g., the EUROMOD data. Hence, even under favorable theoretical conditions, decomposition of tax progression into a term dealing with the income distribution and a term dealing with taxation is limited by empirical data problems.

4.3 Numerical Progression Comparisons

The categorical results of our international comparisons of tax progression are presented in Tables 2 to 7. For these tables we use the following notation:

individual data.
$D$ and $d$ denote progression dominance: $D$ means that the country in the row dominates the country in the column with respect to progression; $d$ means that the country in the row is dominated by the country in the column with respect to progression. Note that the entries $D$ and $d$ are asymmetric: a $D$ in cell $(i, j)$ implies a $d$ in cell $(j, i)$, and vice versa. A superscript $C$ indicates convexity or concavity of the associated relative concentration curve, i.e., that the respective sufficient conditions (elasticities) of Theorems 1 to 3 hold.

$R$ and $r$ denote bifurcate progression: $R$ means that the country in the row is more progressive than the country in the column for the lower income strata and less progressive for the upper income strata; $r$ means that the country in the row is less progressive than the country in the column for the lower income strata and more progressive in the upper income strata. Note again that the entries $R$ and $r$ are asymmetric.

# denotes multiple changes of the progression pattern.

### 4.3.1 International Progression Comparisons: Categorical Summary Results

Tables 2 to 7 present the results corresponding to Definitions 1 to 6. Each cell in these tables contains four entries: the entries in the first line refer to household data, the entries in the second line to equivalized data using the Luxembourg equivalence scales $m^{-\alpha}$ with $\alpha = 0.5$. The left-hand side entries in a cell refer to direct taxes only, while the right-hand side entries to direct taxes plus payroll taxes (which consist mainly of employees’ share in social security contributions).

Inspection of the cells of Tables 2 to 7 shows that only few left-hand side and right-hand side columns differ within each cell. This means that comparative progression is not changed much if we extend the direct taxes by payroll taxes. This is remarkable since payroll taxes are by and large proportional to income for the lower and middle income strata. However, they expire for incomes beyond some benchmark. Moreover, for the lower income strata they are usually considerably higher than the direct taxes. This implies that they have a regressive effect on overall tax progression (for the effect of payroll taxes in isolation see Peichl and Schäfer (2008, pp. 13-4)). On top of that, their structure may be different for different countries. An exceptional case is Denmark, where social security contributions are negligible, because most social expenditures are paid out of the tax revenue. Nevertheless, our results show few differences in comparative progression for direct taxes and direct taxes plus payroll taxes.

Basically the same observation applies to the rows within each cell. Although being less similar than
the columns, most of them have similar appearance. This means that replacing household incomes and
taxes by equivalent incomes and taxes does not cause dramatic changes in the comparative progression
pattern, although the changes are more pronounced than comparisons between direct taxes only and direct
taxes plus payroll taxes. Note that equivalized incomes and taxes tend to be more equally distributed than
household incomes and taxes (cf. Peichl et al., 2009a,b). Countries with structurally greater households
as compared with structurally smaller households are more likely to experience changes between the first
and the second rows in the cells of the tables.

Tables 8 to 11 survey the results of the comparisons across Definitions 1 to 6. They show us that
for international comparisons of uniform tax progression, progression dominance is the rule rather than
the exception. In close to two thirds of all 312 international comparisons, uniform progression dominance
holds.28 Among these cases, for between 63 and 81 percent of progression dominance the respective curve
differences have a single extremum, which means that the sufficient conditions of convexity or concavity
of the associated relative concentration curves hold. However, in between 19 and 37 percent of cases do
we observe that the sufficient conditions of Theorems 1 to 3 do not hold although the associated relative
concentration curves do not cross the diagonal in the unit square.

Uniform progression dominance does not hold for about one third of all cases only. Among these
cases we observe between 67 and 75 percent for which bifurcate progression holds. This means that in
these situations there is a unique benchmark such that uniform progression dominance holds up to this
benchmark and reverses for the quantiles exceeding this benchmark. With respect to all cases this means
that only for between 9 and 11 percent do we not have clear-cut patterns of progression dominance: the

28Note that these are the results of our numerical calculations. As our curves do not draw on the data universe, but
on samples only, the question arises whether curve crossings are statistically significant. Whereas Atkinson (1970, p. 258)
had asserted that for comparisons among twelve countries “in only 16 out of 66 cases do the Lorenz curves not intersect”,
Bishop et al. (1991a, p. 462) found statistically significant intersections of Lorenz curves only in three percent of all cases,
whereas 97 percent of the Lorenz curves were ranked; in contrast to that, simple numerical comparisons would have ranked
only some 75 percent of the comparisons of Lorenz curves. This result holds under the assumption that the differences
between the population Lorenz ordinate and the sample Lorenz ordinate are normally distributed (see also Bishop et al.
(1991b), who showed impressive results also for the double criterion of Lorenz dominance and higher mean income). This
means for our results that we would end up with even more dominance relations if we required curve intersections to be
statistically significant. Most probably, multiple intersections would either vanish or be reduced, and bifurcate intersections
might disappear, primarily those at the lower and upper ends of the distributions.
associated relative concentration curves have in these cases multiple crossings with the diagonal of the unit square or, alternatively, the respective curve differences change their sign more than once. This is negligible as compared with the two thirds of all cases in which uniform progression dominance holds and with more than one fifth of all cases in which bifurcate progression holds.

4.3.2 International Progression Comparisons: Consistency among Progression Concepts

Tables 12 and 13 report the robustness of progression comparisons across our six definitions. These tables show us that full consistency is rather rare: it varies between 6.41 and 14.10 percent for progression dominance and between 15.38 and 25.64 percent for bifurcate progression. However, when we look for at least four consistencies, the consistency rates increase to numbers between 42.31 and 47.44 percent for progression dominance and to numbers between 61.54 and 71.79 percent for bifurcate progression. When we look for at least four consistencies, the consistency rates increase to numbers between 42.31 and 47.44 percent for progression dominance and to numbers between 61.54 and 71.79 percent for bifurcate progression.

Table 14 contains rough indications of similarities and dissimilarities among the progression comparison concepts.\textsuperscript{29} This table is based on pairwise comparisons of the entries in Tables 2 to 7 counting the dominance and bifurcate relationships which are identical between pairs of tables. The first entries in the cells of Table 14 contain the percentages (as averages of all four datasets) of congruence of the respective D’s and R’s in the cells of the pairs of the compared tables, the second entries contain the percentages (as averages of all four datasets) of cases in which a D or R is not matched by the respective symbol in the other table.\textsuperscript{30} Multiple crossings were ignored. We observe strong similarity of 77.89 percent between Definitions 1 and 2, although Definition 1 is expressed in terms of $q$ and Definition 2 in terms of $p$; note that both concern definitions in terms of taxes. Strong similarities are also observed between Definitions 2 and 5 and between Definitions 4 and 6, each with a similarity of more than 68 percent. Note that Definitions 2 and 5 both concern comparisons in terms of taxes; the different mode—$p$ versus $q$—does not seem to matter much. The similarity between Definitions 4 and 6 obviously result from their commonness in terms of net incomes; again their different mode—$p$ versus $q$—does not seem to matter much. Similarities around 60 percent are also observed between Definition 1 on the one hand and Definitions 4 and 5 on the other, and between Definitions 2 and 4. The similarity between Definitions 1 and 5 sounds plausible, because

\textsuperscript{29}Note that consistency between our definitions depends on the data used. Hence, the present analysis reflects the data used for this study.

\textsuperscript{30}Note that we consider a pair of definitions similar if it is either D or R [d or r], but not the opposite ($\sharp, d, r$) [\$,$D,$R], respectively.
they share their formulation in terms of taxes and \( q \). What is really remarkable is the similarity between Definitions 1 and 4, because the first is cast in terms of taxes and \( q \), and the second in terms of net incomes and \( p \). The similarity between Definitions 2 and 4 is partly explained by their common formulation in terms of \( p \). But, given the dissimilarity between Definitions 1 and 3, it is remarkable that switching from \( q \) to the expression in terms of \( p \) reconciles the progression comparisons in terms of taxes and net incomes. Table 14 demonstrates that Definition 3 excels in “lack of solidarity” with the other definitions; it has high rates of dissimilarity. Definition 4, which is, on theoretical grounds, the one most related to Definition 3, has—with one exception only— lower dissimilarity rates than Definition 3.

It is interesting to consider also higher-order consistencies. Including the basis of Table 14 we computed \( 56 \times 4 = 224 \) consistencies in addition to Table 13. Taking again the average percentages of congruence of \( D \) and \( R \) across all four data sets, we observed figures of 44.87 percent or higher for the following six sets of three definitions: (A) \{1,2,4\}[54.17\%], (B) \{1,2,5\}[56.34\%], (C) \{1,4,6\}[45.52\%], (D) \{2,4,5\}[45.19\%], (E) \{2,4,6\}[47.12\%], and (F) \{4,5,6\}[44.87\%]. For four definitions we observed three data sets with at least 39.75 percent congruence: (G) \{1,2,4,5\}[40.39\%], (H) \{1,2,4,6\}[41.03\%], and (J) \{2,4,5,6\}[39.75\%]. For five definitions only one data set had a congruence percentage above 35 percent, viz. (K) \{1,2,4,5,6\}[35.25\%]. Note that G results from the combinations A&B, A&E, and B&E; H results from the combinations A&C, A&D, and C&D; J results from the combinations D&E, D&F, and E&F. K results from the combination of two out of \{G,H,J\}. Note that Definition 3 is a complete outlier; it does not appear in a single one of these high-consistency sets. Note also that the high-consistency sets are naturally pre-shaped by the binary high consistencies as shown in Table 14: all pairs of definitions within the high-consistency sets have also high consistencies in Table 14.

Let us now have a look at the interpretation of changes with respect to analyses in terms of \( q \) and \( p \). For illustration we compare Tables 2 and 3. When looking at these tables, it is striking to see that ‘high tax’ (as conventionally perceived) countries like Sweden and Denmark, medium tax countries like the United Kingdom, and low tax countries like Switzerland and Poland are all classified as less progressive than most other countries. Furthermore, high tax countries like Germany, medium tax countries like France, and low tax countries like the United States are classified as more progressive than most other countries. This is because the measures in this paper are developed for comparing uniform tax progression, not the level of taxation. Sweden and Denmark have taxes that reach a high percentage of income rather fast and remain there, which is more akin to proportional taxation; the same pattern applies to the United Kingdom for a
medium tax burden, and to Switzerland and Poland for a low tax burden. In contrast to that, the income interval for which taxation is steadily increasing as a percentage of income is comparatively extensive in Germany, in France, and in the United States. This explains their dominance with respect to comparisons of tax progression. For similar results using another approach see Peichl and Schäfer (2008, pp. 8-12).

When comparing Tables 2 and 3, consider the cells Australia/Finland, Australia/Norway, Canada/Finland, Canada/Norway, Canada/United Kingdom, Germany/Norway, and United States/Finland. Here we see that bifurcate progression dominance in Table 2 becomes uniform progression dominance in Table 3. On the other hand, the cell Finland/Netherlands shows in three cases progression reversal, and for the cells Norway/Switzerland, Norway/United Kingdom (partly), United States/Canada, and United States/Netherlands uniform progression dominance in Table 2 becomes bifurcate progression dominance in Table 3.

How can this be explained? Suppose the 10 percent poorest income recipients in country 1 pay 2 percent of tax revenue and in country 2 they pay 3 percent of tax revenue, and so on for all q such that the corresponding tax quantiles in country 1 do not exceed the tax quantiles in country 2. Then \((Y^1, T^1)\) is more progressive than \((Y^2, T^2)\) in terms of q. Consider now the fraction of tax revenue paid by the poorest taxpayers whose aggregate income amounts to 10 percent of total income. As we know from p. 11, these are more than 10 percent of the poorest income recipients; let us assume they are 18 percent in country 1 and 14 percent in country 2. Furthermore, let us assume that the poorest 18 percent of income recipients pay 5 percent of total tax revenue in country 1 and 6 percent in country 2. Moreover, we assume that the poorest 14 percent of income recipients in country 2 pay 4.5 percent of total tax revenue. Then \((Y^1, T^1)\) would be less progressive than \((Y^2, T^2)\) in terms of p at p = 0.1. Such patterns provide just one possible explanation for the observed reversal of measured progression or the transformation of uniform progression dominance into bifurcate progression dominance; there is every reason to expect other data-driven explanations to exist.

Consider now bifurcate progression dominance: assume that for up to 40 percent of the poorest income recipients the corresponding tax quantiles are smaller in country 1 than in country 2, and this is reversed after the population cumulant 0.4. Assume that for all p’s as applied to the two countries, \(q_2(p) \leq q_1(p)\) for the two countries; that is, the lower income strata in country 2 are relatively richer than the lower income strata in country 1. Furthermore, assume that the corresponding tax quantiles for \(q_2(p)\) are smaller than the corresponding tax quantiles for \(q_1(p)\) throughout. Then bifurcate progression in terms of q is
consistent with uniformly greater progression in terms of $p$.

These examples show the interaction of the tax schedule and the income distribution for shifts in the progression comparison pattern in terms of $q$ and $p$, respectively. Depending on these components, the comparison of progression may either remain the same in the sense of the categorization in Tables 2 and 3, or it may shift in either direction, as the tables and the above examples show us. Causal explanations may use some global information about the degree of income inequality and about the tax schedules.

For the ease of demonstration the relationships for strict progression dominance for our 24 data sets are presented in terms of Hasse diagrams in Figures 3 to 26. They allow a quicker overview of the structure of progression dominance than Tables 2 to 7.

### 4.3.3 International Progression Comparisons: Selected Country Comparisons

Tables 2 to 7 contain categorical data only; they just report whether we have uniform progression dominance, bifurcate progression or multiple crossings of the associated relative concentration curves. They are silent about the intensity of progression comparisons. Information about this aspect is provided by the 312 graphs of international progression comparisons, where each graph corresponds to one out of the four entries in each cell of Tables 2 to 7 and contains six curves corresponding to the six concepts of comparison of progression as embodied in these six tables. From this set we single out sixteen for presentation in this paper, of which four cover the comparisons between the United Kingdom and the United States, four the comparisons between Germany and the United Kingdom, four the comparisons between Germany and the United States, and four the comparison between Germany and Sweden.

**United Kingdom versus United States** Figure 27 depicts the progression comparisons for UK 1999 versus US 2000 for the direct taxes and household data. In accordance with Tables 2 to 7 we see that US progression dominates UK for all definitions except Definition 3. For Definition 3 tax progression is at first higher in UK than in US and switches at $q = 0.6$ to higher progression for US than for UK. Moreover, note that the curves for Definitions 3, 4, and 6 show much weaker intensity than progression dominance according to the other definitions.

Figure 28 depicts the progression comparisons for UK 1999 versus US 2000 for the direct taxes plus payroll taxes and household data. The pattern is the same as for Figure 27 except that the inclusion of payroll taxes now makes the intensity of progression more pronounced. Figure 29 depicts the progression
comparisons for UK 1999 versus US 2000 for the equivalized direct taxes and equivalized incomes. In accordance with Tables 2 to 7 we see that US progression dominates UK for all definitions except Definition 3. For Definition 3 tax progression is uniformly higher in UK than in US. Figure 30 repeats this pattern for equivalized direct taxes plus payroll taxes and equivalized incomes.

**Germany versus United Kingdom** Figure 31 depicts the progression comparisons for Germany 2000 versus UK 1999 for direct taxes and household data. In accordance with Tables 2 to 7 we see that German progression dominates UK for all definitions except Definition 3. For Definition 3 tax progression is at first higher in UK than in Germany and switches between $q = 0.7$ and $q = 0.75$ to higher progression for Germany than for UK.

Figure 32 depicts the progression comparisons for Germany 2000 versus UK 1999 for the direct taxes plus payroll taxes and household data. Uniformly greater progression for Germany vis-á-vis UK is now observed only for Definitions 2, 4, and 6. For Definition 1, Germany is more progressive except for the highest decile, for which progression switches to UK. For Definition 3, UK starts out with higher progression until $q = 0.7$, beyond which Germany becomes more progressive. Definition 5 shows at the beginning two crossings of the abscissa, but these are negligible; for the higher population quantiles higher progression in Germany becomes dominant.

Figure 33 depicts Germany versus UK for equivalized direct taxes and equivalized incomes. We see nearly uniform progression dominance for Germany; progression dominance for Germany is prevalent also for Definition 3. When adding payroll taxes (Figure 34), we see uniformly greater progression in Germany except for Definitions 1 and 3. Definition 3 concerns the first five percentiles of income recipients beyond which Germany becomes more progressive throughout. Concerning Definition 1, Germany is more progressive up to $q = 0.6$, beyond which UK becomes more progressive. This is obviously caused by the inclusion of payroll taxes.

**Germany versus United States** Comparing Germany and the United States is less clear-cut. Figure 35 depicts progression comparison for direct taxes and household data. For Definition 1, Germany is more progressive for the population quantiles up to $q = 0.8$, beyond which US becomes more progressive. For Definition 2, Germany is uniformly more progressive, although the development just satisfies the necessary condition of being more progressive. Results for Definition 3 are opposite to those for Definition 1: it starts
with more progression for the US and switches to more progression for Germany beyond $q = 0.75$. For Definition 4, US is more progressive for the first nine deciles of $p$; Germany becomes more progressive only for the last decile. The curve for Definition 5 shows multiple crossings with the abscissa; for the major part Germany is more progressive, only for the highest and the lowest deciles US becomes more progressive. Definition 6 shows higher uniform progression for the US, although not very intensive.

Figure 36 shows the situation for household data after adding payroll taxes. The curve of Definition 1 shows multiple crossings with the abscissa up to $q = 0.5$, beyond which Germany becomes markedly more progressive. Germany is uniformly more progressive according to Definition 2. Definition 3 shows higher progression for US up to $q = 0.7$, beyond which Germany becomes more progressive. Definition 4 shows more progression for Germany up to $p = 0.5$ and higher progression for US beyond that. Definition 5 indicates uniformly more progression in US than in Germany. Definition 6 shows more progression in Germany up to $q = 0.7$, and beyond that more progression for US.

Figure 37 depicts equivalized direct taxes and equivalized income data. Definition 1 shows slightly higher German progression up to $q = 0.45$ and considerably higher US progression beyond. Definition 2 shows higher uniform progression for Germany. Definition 3, too, shows higher uniform progression for Germany. Definition 4 indicates slightly higher progression for US up to $p = 0.9$ and higher tax progression for Germany beyond that. Definition 5 shows higher progression for Germany except for a bit more than the last decile of $q$, where US becomes more progressive. The same applies to Definition 6 where US becomes more progressive beyond $q = 0.70$.

Figure 38 considers the added payroll taxes to the situation of Figure 37. For Definitions 1 and 2, US is uniformly more progressive than Germany. For Definition 3, Germany is uniformly more progressive than US. For Definitions 4, 5, and 6 Germany is more progressive at the beginning and after some benchmark becomes less progressive than the US.

**Germany versus Sweden** It is interesting to compare Germany and Sweden, as Sweden is notorious for her high tax burden. Figure 39 shows progression comparison for direct taxes and household data. We see that Germany is uniformly more progressive for Definitions 1, 2, 4, and 5; Definitions 3 and 6 show initially up to $q = 0.3$ slightly higher progression for Sweden, which beyond this population quantile becomes markedly more progression for Germany.

Figure 40 compares progression for direct taxes plus payroll taxes. For this data Germany is uniformly
more progressive than Sweden only for Definition 5; for Definitions 1, 2, 4, and 6 Germany is more progressive than Sweden except for the highest quantiles. This might be caused by the relatively lower assessment thresholds of the social security contributions in Germany. Only Definition 3 is an outlier: it indicates higher progression for Sweden up to $q = 0.3$ and higher progression for Germany beyond this population quantile.

Figure 41 compares progression for direct taxes and equivalized data. We observe greater progression for Germany for all definitions except Definition 3. For Definition 3, Sweden is more progressive for the lower half of the income recipients, and Germany is more progressive for the upper half of the income recipients.

Figure 42 compares progression for direct taxes plus payroll taxes for equivalized data. Germany is more progressive for Definitions 1, 2, and 4. For Definitions 5 and 6 Germany is more progressive except the lowest decile, for which Sweden is slightly more progressive. Again Definition 3 is an outlier: for this progression concept, Sweden is more progressive than Germany up to $q = 0.45$ beyond which Germany becomes more progressive.

Hence, the general picture exhibits greater progression in Germany as compared to Sweden, although Sweden’s relative tax burden is higher than Germany’s.\footnote{Eurostat, Tables tec00018 and tec00019, tell us the percentages of taxes from income and wealth and social security contributions (in square brackets; employees’ and employers’ contributions taken together) of GDP for 2008 (selected figures): EU 27 mean 13.1 [13.7]; EU 15 mean 13.5 [13.9]; Belgium 16.6 [16.1]; United Kingdom 16.7 [8.4]; Sweden 17.4 [12.0]; Finland 17.5 [12.2]; Iceland 18.3 [2.8]; Norway 22.0 [8.9]; Denmark 29.8 [1.8]. The figures for Germany are 11.3 [16.4]. This shows that Germany is a low-tax country with respect to income and wealth taxes and a high-tax country with respect to social security contributions; as concerns social security contributions, it is topped only by France [17.9] among all 25 member countries of the EU and the two associated countries Iceland and Norway.}

### 4.3.4 Intertemporal Progression Comparisons

We have data for intertemporal progression comparisons for all selected countries except France. However, because of space limitations we restrict ourselves here to just three countries, viz. the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Of course, we could cover only periods for which full sets of comparable data are available. The confines of data availability precludes too long time intervals.\footnote{Piketty and Saez (2003) and Piketty (2003) endeavored to study income inequality for extremely long periods, relying on income tax data. As income taxes affected in their first decades only the top income strata, they had to confine their}
For the United States we have data of the waves 1991, 1994, 2000, 2004. The wave 1991 was in the mid-term of the Bush Senior Administration (1989-93). In his election campaign, Bush Senior had promised: “Read my lips: no new taxes.” Since he broke his election pledge, it seems for financing the first Iraq War, he was not re-elected. The waves 1994 and 2000 concern the Clinton Administration (1993-2001). Clinton took over office on January 20, 1993, which ended on January 20, 2001. Clinton was very successful in reducing budget deficits, promoting NAFTA, and getting on good terms with China and Russia. On August 5, 1997, Clinton signed the Tax Relief Act, which meant a significant tax cut effective as of January 1, 1998. Moreover, his administration was a peaceful period. The very end of his administration was overshadowed by the dotcom crisis. The wave 2004 concerns the fourth year of the Bush Junior administration. Bush Junior and Cheney were supposed of favoring the upper income strata of the American Society. Moreover, this period was overshadowed by the second Iraq War, which was largely financed by high budget deficits. Hence, the progression changes 1991/94 (Bush Senior to Clinton), 1994/2000 (beginning and end of the Clinton Administration), and 2000/04 (Clinton to Bush Junior) are of interest.

Table 15 provides a concise summary on the categorical data of comparisons of tax progression. We use the following notation: Bsen means “Bush Senior”, C* means “Clinton 1994”, C** means “Clinton 2000”, and Bjun means “Bush Junior”. An arrow means that the first entry is taken as a starting point and the second entry as the end point of the comparison. For instance, the entry $d_{[D]}$ under $91 \rightarrow 94$ and $Bsen \rightarrow C^*$, respectively, means that the tax system in 1991 under the Bush Senior Administration was less progressive [more progressive] than in 1994 under the Clinton Administration. The first three double columns in Table 15 concern the comparisons over adjoining periods, the second three double columns concern comparions over longer periods. The twelve Graphs 43 to 54 are the associated graphs for the first three double columns of Table 15. The remaining graphs are available from the authors upon request.

The picture of the comparison $Bsen \rightarrow C^*$ is rather uniform: most entries in the first double column of Table 15 indicate a higher progression for 1994 than for 1991. The marked exception is Definition 3 which indicates a higher progression for 1991 than for 1994. Definition 5, Definition 1 for equivalized tax data, and Definition 6 for taxes plus payroll taxes and household data show higher progression in 1991 than in 1994 for the lower income strata and lower progression for the higher income strata. With the exception of Definition 3, this evidence confirms of what we would have expected from the transition from Bush Senior investigations to the top income decile of the respective countries.
The picture of the comparison $C^* \rightarrow C^{**}$ (see Figures 47 to 50) is less clear-cut. It seems that the Clinton 1997 tax reform was more a general tax cut than a change in tax progression. Indeed, we observe not a single instance such that the 2000 tax system is less progressive than the 1994 tax system. Indeed, Definition 6 indicates a higher progression of the tax system for 2000 than for 1994. Ignoring some negligible intersections among the lower income strata, Definition 2 shows also less progression for 2000 than for 1994 for the upper income strata. Also Definition 3 indicates more progression for 2000 for the lower income strata, again ignoring negligible intersections for lower income strata for household data. The same applies to Definition 4 which indicates higher progression for the lower income strata and less for the higher income strata in 2000 as compared to 1994. Definition 5 shows higher progression in 2000 than in 1994 for the lower income strata for household data, but not for the equivalized data. Thus, the Clinton 1997 tax reform did not benefit the lower income strata in relative terms.

The picture of the comparison $C^{**} \rightarrow BJ$ (see Figures 51 to 54) shows uniformly less progression for 2004 as compared to 2000 for Definitions 3, 4, and 6 for household data, and Definition 2 for direct taxes and for direct taxes plus payroll taxes. For Definition 3 and equivalized data, progression was higher for the lower income strata in 2000 than in 2004. Definition 2 is ambivalent for direct taxes: the 2000 taxes are by and large more progressive than the 2004 taxes for household data but less progressive for the equivalized data. According to Definition 5 the tax system was by and large more progressive in 2000 than in 2004, except for equivalized data and direct taxes, where 2000 shows less progression than 2004. Here, Definition 1 is an outlier: for household data it indicates more progression in 2004 than in 2000, and for equivalized data it indicates less progression for the lower income strata in 2004 than in 2000. Hence, except Definition 1, the transition from Clinton to Bush Junior all in all, comes up with the expectation of a less progressive tax system.

When we compare progression between the two Bush Administrations, taking the respective graphs (available from the authors) into account, Definitions 4 and 6 do not indicate major changes. The results for Definitions 1 and 3 are contradictory: whereas according to Definition 1 the 2004 tax system is more progressive than the 1991 tax system, Definition 3 tells us that the 1991 tax system was more progressive than the 2004 tax system. The same applies to Definitions 2 and 5 as well: according to Definition 2, the 1991 tax system was more progressive for the upper income strata and for the very low income strata and less progressive than the 2004 tax system for the middle income strata. According to Definition 5,
however, the 1991 tax system was more progressive for the lower and less progressive for the upper income strata (except the equivalized data for tax plus payroll tax for which the 1991 tax system was also more progressive for the highest two deciles) than then 2004 tax system. Hence, we have no clear-cut message concerning the progression comparisons between the two Bush Administrations.

Comparing the progression of the Bush Senior Administration with the end of the Clinton Administration shows widespread contradictions. Table 15 shows for 91→00 contradictions between Definitions 1 and 5 on the one hand, and Definition 4 on the other. Another contradiction is shown between Definitions 3 and 6. It seems that that our definitions are sensitive to the indeterminate development during the Clinton Administration.

Progression comparisons between the second year of the Clinton Administration (1994) and the Bush Junior Administration are more telling. The last double column of Table 15 together with the respective graphs (available from the authors) evidence by and large higher progression for the 1994 tax system than for the 2004 tax system. There are some exceptions: Definition 1 shows higher progression for 2004 for the household data and for the equivalized data for the direct taxes. For Definition 2 the 1994 tax system is more progressive for the upper income strata for the direct taxes than the 2004 tax system. Definition 3 shows higher progression of the 1994 tax system as compared to the 2004 tax system for the top income strata for the equivalized data. Definition 5 gives contradictory evidence for the household and equivalized data concerning the direct taxes. Hence, the 2004 tax system emerges by and large as less progressive than the 1994 tax system, in particular for the high income strata, which conforms with what we would have expected from the Bush Junior Administration.

United Kingdom  For the United Kingdom we have data of the waves 1991, 1995, 1999, and 2004. With respect to fiscal policy, the last two years before 1991 witnessed Margaret Thatcher’s unfortunate replacement of local community taxes by a poll tax, called “community charge”. It was introduced in Scotland in 1989 and in England and Wales in 1990. It led to serious unrest among the population: in March 31, 1990, there was a demonstration on Trafalgar Square with more than 100,000 protesters. Margaret Thatcher, who became Prime Minister on May 4, 1979, resigned on November 28, 1990. Her successor became John Major, whose terms of office ended on May 2, 1997. The United Kingdom slid into an economic recession in the period 1990-3. In addition the Black Wednesday on September 16, 1992, occurred during the Major Government: by short selling sterling, George Soros succeeded in a sweeping
speculation against the British Pound, which caused a loss of £3.4 billion for Britain. On January 27, 1991, Britain participated in the Gulf War joining the UNO forces with 53,462 soldiers. Major succeeded in overcoming Britain's economic recession: the number of unemployed had decreased from 3 million in 1993 to 2 million in 1996. However, Major had problems with the “Euro-Rebels” in his party. After a catastrophic loss of the Conservatives in the 1997 elections, Major resigned. His follower was Tony Blair of the Labour Party. His office extended from May 2, 1997, to June 27, 2007. He was Prime Minister for the three periods 1997-2001, 2001-5, 2005-7. Blair increased public expenditure for education and health-care; at the same time he planned to reduce budget deficits. After his victory in the 2001 elections he increased taxes. In 2003 he sided the Bush Junior Administration in the Iraq War with 46,000 soldiers, about one third of Britain’s military force. Blair introduced minimum wages and reforms to strengthen the private sector of the British economy. Because of incorrect information of the public concerning the reasons for participating in the Iraq War, Blair had to resign.

Table 16 shows rather clear-cut results: for all three double columns, viz. 95→99, 99→04, and 91→04, we observe less progresion of the tax system for the later year, with the notorious exception of Definition 3, which says the opposite. As Table 16 is explicit enough for these cases, we can dispense with presenting the respective graphs (available from the authors). The situation is more intricate for the change from Thatcher to Major, viz. 91→95: Figures 55 to 58 show us for Definition 1 higher progression for the 1995 tax system than for 1991. This holds also for Definition 2, except for the household data, for which the 1995 tax system is less progressive for the upper income strata. Definition 3 shows higher progression for 1995 for the low income strata and lower for the upper income strata for household data than for 1991, and by and large greater progression for 1991 for equvalized data. Definition 4 is not very explicit for the direct taxes, but shows more progression for 1991 for the tax plus payroll tax data. Definition 5 exhibits more progression for 1995 than for 1991 except partially at the lower and upper ends of the income strata. Definition 6 does not tell us much as concerns the direct tax data, but indicates higher progression for 1995 for the tax plus payroll tax data. Summarizing, it seems that the balance tilts in favor of more progression for 1995 as compared with 1991, but this tendency is very weak. The transitions from Major to Blair and from Blair to Blair are, in contrast to that, characterized by decreasing progression except according to Definition 3.
Germany  For Germany we have data of the waves 1989, 1994, and 2000. In Germany, there was a big tax reform extending from 1986 to 1990 (see Seidl and Kaletha (1987)). Hence, 1989 was the last year before the end of the tax reform. November 9, 1989, was the date of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Thereafter the German Democratic Republic existed until October 3, 1990, when the German unification took place. Hence, 1989 was the last year before the 1986-90 tax reform was completed, and the last year of West Germany as a self-contained state. Kohl had become Chancellor of Germany on October 1, 1982, and resigned on October 27, 1998, after an electoral defeat. Then Schröder succeeded him in office. Kohl had survived the 1994 elections as chancellor only after severe electoral losses. For the purpose of financing the German unification, a solidarity surcharge on top of the income tax was introduced on July 1, 1991, and expired on June 30, 1992. It amounted to 7.5 percent of the income tax. As the German unification proved more expensive than originally anticipated, it was reintroduced in 1995 amounting again to 7.5 percent of the income tax; in 1997 it was reduced to 5.5 percent. The top tax rate for business income was reduced to 47 percent as of January 1, 1994. In 1997, another tax reform was enacted (see Seidl and Traub (1997)). On July 6, 2000, the German Parliament enacted another tax reform extending from January 1, 2001 to January 1, 2005.

Germany shows us a development opposite to that of the United Kingdom. Whereas in the United Kingdom the tax system became less progressive in later time, the German tax system became more progressive in the lapse of time. Except some negligible intersections and except Definition 3, the Figures 59 to 62 show that the German tax system became between 1989 and 1994 more progressive for the lower income strata and less progressive for the upper income strata. Definition 3 makes here again for its notorious exception. Figures 63 to 66 demonstrate that this development continued in the period from 1994 to 2000. It is even reinforced, as the tax system became basically more progressive for all income strata. Even the notorious exception, Definition 3, signals higher progression for the lower income strata (and less progression for the upper income strata). As regards the development in the period from 1989 to 2000, we encounter again higher progression either for all income strata, or sometimes for the lower income strata accompanied with less progression for the upper income strata. Again Definition 3 marches to a different drummer. Thus, in spite of all reforms to cut minimum and top marginal tax rates, the German tax system had become more progressive in the period 1989 to 2000, at least for the lower income strata; interestingly enough, it had partly become less progressive for the upper income strata for taxes plus payroll taxes. This reflects that the cuts in top marginal tax rates for the high income strata overcompensated.
the relative increase in social security contributions.

### 4.4 Equivalence Scales Matter

Finally we checked the influence of equivalence scales on uniform tax progression. For this purpose we started with choosing \( \alpha = 0.25 \) for the LIS equivalence scale \( m^{-\alpha} \) and let \( \alpha \) increase to 0.5 and further to 0.75. It is interesting to see that equivalence scales do indeed matter for some definitions of greater tax progression. Their influence is similar for all 13 countries. It is in particular Definitions 1 and 3 which are extremely sensitive to equivalence scales. Definitions 2 and 5 are also influenced by the scale parameter, but markedly less than the former ones. The influence of the parameter of the equivalence scale with respect to Definition 1 can account for up to eight percent of tax progression comparisons.

In particular, we observe the following effects of the parameter \( \alpha \) of the equivalence scale on tax progression comparisons: the most spectacular effects are observed for Definitions 1 and 3. As the parameter \( \alpha \) increases, tax progression strongly increases according to Definition 1 and strongly decreases according to 3. For increasing \( \alpha \), tax progression according to Definition 2 increases also, but much less distinctive than for Definition 1. For Definition 5 we observe bifurcation: as the parameter \( \alpha \) increases, tax progression according to Definition 5 increases for the lower income strata and decreases for the upper income strata. There are no major effects of equivalence scales for Definitions 4 and 6. This is demonstrated for selected graphs for Germany, UK and US in Figures 71 to 82 for \( \alpha = 0.25 \) versus \( \alpha = 0.75 \). This pattern is characteristic for all 13 countries.

What is the lesson to be learned from this parameter sensitivity? First, when working with equivalized data, one should bear in mind the high parameter sensitivity of Definitions 1 and 3. For international comparisons of tax progression, Definitions 1 and 3 in particular may lead to different results depending on the value of the scale parameter applied. This parameter sensitivity of equivalized data can be much reduced for Definitions 4 and 6. Other scholars may prefer to rely more on household data rather than on equivalized data. This comes up to be a matter of taste. Our task is to point out the scale parameter sensitivity of the definitions of measuring greater progression as proposed in this study.
5 Conclusion

This paper starts with a concise review of methods of measuring and comparing tax progression. Local measures of tax progression suffer from their neglect of the income distribution, global measures of tax progression suffer from the disadvantage of all aggregation, viz. that much information is lost in the aggregation procedure, and uniform comparisons of tax progression suffer from their assumption that the same income distribution has to hold for all situations to be compared. Based on uniform comparisons of tax progression, Seidl (1994) proposed that, instead of comparing tax schedules and income distributions in terms of incomes, they should be compared in terms of population and income quantiles. This approach replaces the different supports of income distributions by the distributions of population or income quantiles, whose support is the unit interval. This allows constructing relative concentration curves and curve differences by using the same values of population or income quantiles for the situations to be compared.

We use this approach in empirical research. We investigate uniform tax progression comparing 13 countries from the LIS database, which have, of course, different tax and payroll tax schedules, as well as different income distributions. We employ six different measurement devices of progression comparison, three in terms of taxes and three in terms of net incomes. Our analyses are carried out for household data and for equivalized data using the Luxembourg equivalence scale with parameter value \( \alpha = 0.5 \). Although we expected more intricate patterns to be the case rather than dominance relations, we observe uniformly greater tax progression in about two thirds of all cases. Out of these cases about two thirds can be thought of (in continuous terms) as having convex or concave relative concentration curves, which means that for those cases the sufficient conditions of Theorems 1 to 3 hold (see Figure 1). In terms of first-order or second-order curve differences this case is represented by a single extremum. For about one third of those cases we observe progression dominance without concavity or convexity of the associated relative concentration curves. In terms of first-order or second-order curve differences this case is represented by curve non-intersecting the abscissa and having multiple extrema. For about one fifth of all cases we observe bifurcate progression, i.e., higher progression for one country up to a certain threshold and higher progression for the other country beyond this threshold. Only for about one tenth of all international comparisons do we observe interlaced progression patterns.

Note that the proposed methodology compares tax progression, not the level of the tax burden. This means that not all high-tax countries dominate with respect to progression. This is in particular the case
for Scandinavian countries which reach a high tax level already at comparatively modest incomes; hence, their tax schedules do not emerge as notably progressive. On the other hand, low-tax countries like the United States and high-tax countries like Germany emerge as rather progressive because the increase in taxation extends over longer intervals. Based on actual data, some of the progression concepts look similar. This is in particular observed for Definitions 1 and 2, for Definitions 2 and 5, and for Definitions 4 and 6 (see Section 3.3). Definition 3 jars with the other definitions; it has high rates of dissimilarity. It is remarkable that Definition 3 is at variance even with Definition 4, although both are defined in terms of net incomes. Formulations in terms of income quantiles seem to be more compliant both among themselves and among the other progression concepts except Definition 3. Tables 2 to 7 show the categorical data of tax progression. The strict progression dominance relationships are arranged in terms of Hasse diagrams in the 24 Figures 3 to 26.

This is followed by sixteen graphs for comparisons among Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and among Germany and Sweden. We see that, except for Definition 3, both Germany and the United States have more progressive tax systems than the United Kingdom. As concerns progression comparisons between Germany and the United States, we find some definitions indicating higher progression for Germany, others for the United States. Comparing Germany and Sweden shows by and large greater progression for Germany, although Sweden has the higher tax level. In many cases we observe bifurcate progression, or multiple crossings with the abscissa. Progression comparison in this case depends very much on the data set and on the progression concept applied.

Then we conduct intertemporal comparisons of tax progression for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Whereas the transition from Bush Senior to early Clinton meant an increase in tax progression, late Clinton showed higher progression for the low and lower progression for the upper income strata as compared with early Clinton. The transition from Clinton to Bush Junior was accompanied by less progression of the tax system. The developments in the United Kingdom and in Germany are more clear-cut: while the tax system became less progressive in the United Kingdom in the lapse of time, it became more progressive in Germany.

Finally, we investigate the influence of the equivalence scales on comparisons of tax progression. We observe a rather similar picture for all countries: whereas Definitions 1 and 3 are highly and contrariwise sensitive to the scale parameter applied, Definition 2 is less sensitive to the scale parameter, and Definition 5 is for the lower and the upper income strata differently sensitive to the scale parameter. Definitions 4
and 6 are largely insensitive to the choice of the scale parameter.

Hence, this paper shows that different tax schedules and different income distributions are no obstacle to international and intertemporal comparisons of tax progression in terms of dominance relations. This approach enables more detailed judgments than, for instance, global measures of tax progression. Uniform comparisons of tax progression inform about the structure of tax progression, e.g., whether the tax system of a country or a time period is more progressive at the lower or at the upper end of the income strata, or whether it dominates the tax system of another country or period throughout. On top of this categorical information, our graphs of pairwise country or time period comparisons also provide cardinal information about the intensity of greater or smaller tax progression in terms of the shape of the respective curves and the areas below these curves.

Acknowledgements

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Table 2: Progression (non)dominance according to Definition 1
Compares \((T_1, Y_1)\) for the country in the row with \((T_2, Y_2)\) for the country in the column for Definition 1 (taxes, parameter: \(q\)) and vice versa.

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Legend. \(D\) (\(d\)) means that country row (column) dominates country column (row) in terms of concentration curves for taxes (Definition 1). \(C\) indicates convexity (concavity) of the relative concentration curve (sufficient conditions from Theorems 1-3 hold). \(R\) (\(r\)) means that country row (column) dominates country column (row) for a lower quantile and is dominated by country column (row) for an upper quantile (just 1 intersection). \# indicates more than 1 intersection. For each cell: upper-left and upper-right corners correspond to household-based analysis (taxes and taxes + other mandatory contributions, respectively); bottom-left and bottom-right corners correspond to equalized-income-based analysis (taxes and taxes + other mandatory contributions, respectively).
Table 3: Progression (non)dominance according to Definition 2

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Legend. \(D\) (\(d\)) means that country row (column) dominates country column (row) in terms of concentration curves for taxes, based on gross income quantiles (Definition 2). \(C\) indicates convexity (concavity) of the relative concentration curve (sufficient conditions from Theorems 1-3 hold). \(R\) (\(r\)) means that country row (column) dominates country column (row) for a lower quantile and is dominated by country column (row) for an upper quantile (just 1 intersection). \# indicates more than 1 intersection. For each cell: upper-left and upper-right corners correspond to household-based analysis (taxes and taxes + other mandatory contributions, respectively); bottom-left and bottom-right corners correspond to equivalized-income-based analysis (taxes and taxes + other mandatory contributions, respectively).
Table 4: Progression (non)dominance according to Definition 3
Comprises \((T^1, Y^1)\) for the country in the row with \((T^2, Y^2)\) for the country in the column for Definition 3 (net incomes, parameter: \(q\)) and vice versa.

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**Legend.**  
- \(D (d)\) means that country row (column) dominates country column (row) in terms of concentration curves for net incomes (Definition3). 
- \(C\) indicates convexity (concavity) of the relative concentration curve (sufficient conditions from Theorems 1-3 hold). 
- \(R (r)\) means that country row (column) dominates country column (row) for a lower quantile and is dominated by country column (row) for an upper quantile (just 1 intersection). 
- # indicates more than 1 intersection. For each cell: upper-left and upper-right corners correspond to household-based analysis (taxes and taxes + other mandatory contributions, respectively); bottom-left and bottom-right corners correspond to equalized-income-based analysis (taxes and taxes + other mandatory contributions, respectively).
Table 5: Progression (non)dominance according to Definition 4
Compares \( (T^1, Y^1) \) for the country in the row with \( (T^2, Y^2) \) for the country in the column for Definition 4 (net incomes, parameter: \( p \)) and vice versa.

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Legend. \( D (d) \) means that country row (column) dominates country column (row) in terms of concentration curves for net incomes, based on gross income quantiles (Definition 4). \( C \) indicates convexity (concavity) of the relative concentration curve (sufficient conditions from Theorems 1-3 hold). \( R (r) \) means that country row (column) dominates country column (row) for a lower quantile and is dominated by country column (row) for an upper quantile (just 1 intersection). \# indicates more than 1 intersection. For each cell: upper-left and upper-right corners correspond to household-based analysis (taxes and taxes + other mandatory contributions, respectively); bottom-left and bottom-right corners correspond to equivalized-income-based analysis (taxes and taxes + other mandatory contributions, respectively).
Table 6: Progression (non)dominance according to Definition 5

Compares \((T^1, Y^1)\) for the country in the row with \((T^2, Y^2)\) for the country in the column for Definition 5 (differences of tax concentration curves, parameter: \(q\)) and vice versa

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Legend. \(D\) (\(d\)) means that country row (column) dominates country column (row) in terms of second-order differences of concentration curves for gross incomes and taxes (Definition 5). \(C\) indicates convexity (concavity) of the relative concentration curve (sufficient conditions from Theorems 1-3 hold). \(R\) (\(r\)) means that country row (column) dominates country column (row) for a lower quantile and is dominated by country column (row) for an upper quantile (just 1 intersection). \# indicates more than 1 intersection. For each cell: upper-left and upper-right corners correspond to household-based analysis (taxes and taxes + other mandatory contributions, respectively); bottom-left and bottom-right corners correspond to equivalized-income-based analysis (taxes and taxes + other mandatory contributions, respectively).
Table 7: Progression (non)dominance according to Definition 6
Compares \((T^1, Y^1)\) for the country in the row with \((T^2, Y^2)\) for the country in the column for Definition 6 (differences of net income concentration curves, parameter: \(q\)) and vice versa

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Legend. \(D (d)\) means that country row (column) dominates country column (row) in terms of second-order differences of concentration curves for gross and net incomes (Definition6). \(C\) indicates convexity (concavity) of the relative concentration curve (sufficient conditions from Theorems 1-3 hold). \(R (r)\) means that country row (column) dominates country column (row) for a lower quantile and is dominated by country column (row) for an upper quantile (just 1 intersection). \# indicates more than 1 intersection. For each cell: upper-left and upper-right corners correspond to household-based analysis (taxes and taxes + other mandatory contributions, respectively); bottom-left and bottom-right corners correspond to equivalized-income-based analysis (taxes and taxes + other mandatory contributions, respectively).
Table 8: Summary tax progression statistics for household data, taxes

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Table 9: Summary tax progression statistics for household data, taxes+payroll

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Table 10: Summary tax progression statistics for equivalized data, taxes

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Table 11: Summary tax progression statistics for equivalized data, taxes+payroll

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64
Table 12: Summary statistics: consistency for strict dominance

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<td>9</td>
<td>11.54</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.97</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Summary statistics: consistency for bifurcate dominance (one consistent intersection is allowed)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidence of bifurcate dominance (out of 6)</th>
<th>Household data, taxes</th>
<th>Household data, taxes+payroll</th>
<th>Equivalized data, taxes</th>
<th>Equivalized data, taxes+payroll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of cases</td>
<td>% of total cases</td>
<td># of cases</td>
<td>% of total cases</td>
<td># of cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15.38</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26.92</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29.49</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23.08</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 14: (Dis)Similarities among progression comparison concepts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Definition 2</th>
<th>Definition 3</th>
<th>Definition 4</th>
<th>Definition 5</th>
<th>Definition 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition 1</td>
<td>77.88</td>
<td>21.15</td>
<td>31.41</td>
<td>68.27</td>
<td>61.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61.54</td>
<td>36.54</td>
<td>59.61</td>
<td>39.75</td>
<td>48.72</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>57.69</td>
<td>60.90</td>
<td>37.18</td>
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<td>68.59</td>
<td>26.92</td>
<td>50.96</td>
<td>47.44</td>
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<td>.</td>
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<td>38.78</td>
<td>61.22</td>
<td>56.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>56.41</td>
<td>42.95</td>
<td>53.84</td>
<td>45.84</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>50.96</td>
<td>47.11</td>
</tr>
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<td>68.91</td>
<td>26.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>56.41</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Legend. The first [second] entry in a cell denotes the average percentage of similarity [dissimilarity] between a pair of definitions. Symmetric entries are indicated by the dot sign (.).
Table 15: US progression dominance for Bush sen., Clinton, and Bush jun.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>91→94</th>
<th>94→00</th>
<th>00→04</th>
<th>91→00</th>
<th>91→00</th>
<th>94→04</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bsen → C*</td>
<td>C* → C**</td>
<td>C** → Bjun</td>
<td>Bsen → Bjun</td>
<td>Bsen → C**</td>
<td>C* → Bjun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. 1</td>
<td>dC  dC</td>
<td>R  #</td>
<td>d  d</td>
<td>dC  dC</td>
<td>R  #</td>
<td>#  #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. 2</td>
<td>d  d</td>
<td>#  #</td>
<td>#  D</td>
<td>#  #</td>
<td>#  #</td>
<td>#  D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. 3</td>
<td>D  D</td>
<td>#  #</td>
<td>dC  dC</td>
<td>dC  dC</td>
<td>D  D</td>
<td>dC  dC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. 4</td>
<td>d  d</td>
<td>r  r</td>
<td>D  D</td>
<td>r  r</td>
<td>r  r</td>
<td>D  D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. 5</td>
<td>R  R</td>
<td>#  #</td>
<td>R  #</td>
<td>R  R</td>
<td>R  R</td>
<td>R  D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. 6</td>
<td>d  R</td>
<td>dC  d</td>
<td>D  D</td>
<td>R  R</td>
<td>dC  dC</td>
<td>D  D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: UK progression dominance for Thatcher, Major, and Blair

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>91→95</th>
<th>95→99</th>
<th>99→04</th>
<th>91→04</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Th → Ma</td>
<td>Ma → Bi*</td>
<td>Bi* → Bi**</td>
<td>Th → Bi**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. 1</td>
<td>R  #</td>
<td>dC  dC</td>
<td>D  D</td>
<td>D  D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. 2</td>
<td>r  r</td>
<td>D  D</td>
<td>D  D</td>
<td>D  D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. 3</td>
<td>#  #</td>
<td>D  D</td>
<td>D  D</td>
<td>D  D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. 4</td>
<td>*  r</td>
<td>d  d</td>
<td>#  #</td>
<td>#  r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. 5</td>
<td>*  r</td>
<td>dC  dC</td>
<td>D  D</td>
<td>D  D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. 6</td>
<td>*  r</td>
<td>dC  dC</td>
<td>D  D</td>
<td>D  D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 17: German progression dominance for Kohl and Schröder

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>89–94 K* → K**</th>
<th>94–00 K** → S</th>
<th>89–00 K* → S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Def. 1</td>
<td>v # d # d# d</td>
<td>v r d17 r r</td>
<td>v r d17 r r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. 2</td>
<td># # # # #</td>
<td># R # # # #</td>
<td># R # # # #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. 3</td>
<td>D # d17 r #</td>
<td>D # d17 d #</td>
<td>D # d17 d #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. 4</td>
<td># # d d d# d</td>
<td># # R R R R</td>
<td># # R R R R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. 5</td>
<td>D # d17 R #</td>
<td>D # R # # #</td>
<td>D # R # # #</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>